“A FAMOUS INDISCRETION” AS THE AIR WAR PEAKSlong range, the term “expulsion” was coined. Kissinger had displayed a policy objec-
tive for which he might be willing to make tradeoffs, and the idea endured even
though he did not repeat the indiscretion.
B. The last Israeli airborne raid and the first Phantom shootdown
Meanwhile—even if the Soviet pilots’ claim to have downed an IAF Skyhawk on
22 June is discounted—their presence was impressed on the Israelis again a week
later. On the 29th, an IDF force flown in on five helicopters attacked an “administra-
tive” facility near “the Soviet-operated Bir Arida airbase,” and ambushed an Eg yptian
ground patrol. Masregah reported that Soviet-piloted MiG-21s were scrambled to
intercept the intruders. Dayan personally ordered in a Phantom to distract the
Soviets, but it was instructed to avoid engagement. Chief of Staff Bar-Lev told the
returning raiders: “this was in an area under Russian air control, and we did it under
their noses. The Russians came pretty close, but the situation wasn’t serious enough
to put a plane of ours into actual combat.”^14 He pronounced the raid a complete
success—but it was the last ground-forces landing that the IDF would attempt in the
Eg yptian hinterland. As on 18 April, the very presence of the Soviet squadrons
achieved a deterrent effect.
Nasser arrived in Moscow the same day (29 June), with an entourage that again
included Riad, Fawzy and Heikal (newly appointed as information minister). Most
of his eighteen-day sojourn was devoted to medical treatment. Dr Chazov finally saw
him and was shocked by his state, which again indicates that the Eg yptian president
had not been in the USSR in December, January or any time since his previous
examination in Cairo in September 1969.^15 The main political talks with the Soviet
leadership took place on 30 June and 1 July, with both sides getting constant updates
about momentous developments on the canal front.
In retrospect, a watershed was marked when the Soviet-manned SAM-3s and
Eg yptian SAM-2 batteries, along with independent Strela and Shilka detachments
besides those attached to the missile divizyons, were incorporated into a unified com-
mand in the canal zone, with overlapping coverage and improved detection systems
and communications. The Soviet units were now encouraged to initiate engagements
with the IAF craft that were struggling to prevent the entire array’s renewed eastward
progress. As Smirnov described it, until then “the enemy conducted active air recon-
naissance, but as a rule Israeli aircraft did not enter the range of our divizyons. Several
Arab divizyons suffered hits. [But] the Phantoms had time to turn around and get out
of [our] range. Operational tactics had to be changed.”
Israeli reconnaissance concluded on 30 June that the IAF’s success in bombing out
the newly dug missile emplacements had failed to stop the SAMs’ advance eastward.
The Soviets had overcome the setback by dispensing with the protection of concrete
shelters, and instead began “ambushing” IAF attackers within hours of taking up