THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Soviet pilots chasing Skyhawks across the canal on 25 July as the final provocation
that triggered the assembly of twelve Israeli aces to initiate a clash with the Soviets.^16
A year later, Dayan would ask a Soviet emissary:
why did your airplanes try to shoot ours along the Suez Canal, just one month or three
weeks before the ceasefire? ... We tried all the time to avoid ... any clash with your air-
planes, but ... we were faced with the situation either to be shot or to run away.^17This was said in hindsight; after the 21 July incident, Dayan had in fact balked at
forcing a showdown with the Soviets, and insisted on bringing IAF chief Hod’s pro-
posal to “lay a trap for the Russians” before the entire cabinet. To the IAF command’s
surprise, the cabinet approved the idea on 25 July—the very day of the second
Skyhawk incident.^18 The same day, an Israeli military correspondent was already told
by “military observers” that since “the Russians have ... decided to take an active part
in air battles in the canal zone ... dogfights between Soviet and Israeli pilots are just a
matter of time.”^19 Detailed planning began, expanding on tactics that had been tried
against Eg yptian pilots, most recently in April.^20 Meanwhile, according to
Akimenkov, the Soviets and Eg yptians attempted the same entrapment idea. The first
time around, the Israelis declined the gambit—or just responded more slowly than
expected:
A pair of Arab MiG-17s was to bomb Israeli positions across the canal. ... The expectation
was that the Israelis would scramble the [Mirage] detail on duty, which would give chase
to the Arab pair across to our side of the canal, and we would engage them over Eg yptian
soil. We were categorically forbidden to cross the canal. On the morning of 27 July we flew
according to the rehearsed scheme. The Arabs completed their attack, but the Israeli planes
took off too late.On the second try, the Soviet tactic was foiled by the incompetence of the
Eg yptians—for whom Akimenkov barely hides his contempt.
The Arabs, inspired by their success, forced us to include a formation of their MiG-21s in
order to relay signals [to the MiG-17s]. ... On the runway they staged such a bazaar that it
disrupted the entire planned timetable. In sum, we were late and got aloft only when the
Israeli Mirages were already on the way home, having shot down the two MiG-17s. ... The
only consolation was that the Arab pilots bailed out successfully. Credit must be given
them when due. They had learned to get out of planes in time.^21C. ... and losing it
Close to midday on 30 July, Akimenkov was scrambled and directed south. “Soon we
were over the Sokhna valley, where charred remains of MiGs littered the ground. We
got the explanation at Beni Suef. The Israelis had got fed up with our air-ambush