The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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CEASEFIRE VIOLATION SEALS A STRATEGIC GAIN


A. U-2 flights come too late


Ten minutes before the ceasefire came into effect at midnight between 7 and
8 August, an Israeli pilot on patrol east of the Suez Canal saw multiple headlights go
on beyond the Eg yptian lines and move in convoys eastward.^1 Standstill provisions
notwithstanding, the SAM belt was advancing into positions that would not only
cover the canal itself but create a no-fly zone at least 20 kilometers to its east—the
very outcome that the IAF had fought so hard to prevent.^2 Nasser was soon explain-
ing publicly to critics of the ceasefire, such as the PLO’s Yasser Arafat, that this had
been his purpose in acceding to Rogers’s proposal.^3
This had not been unforeseen: in addition to concern over the losses on 30 July, a
purpose widely imputed to Air Force Chief Marshal Kutakhov’s visit was to work out
a way to achieve this advantage even under a ceasefire regime—that is, to ascertain
under what inspection procedures it might be accomplished.^4 Given the Soviets’
continuing denial of their troops’ very presence in Eg ypt, and hence of their collusion
in the exercise, it is hardly surprising that an even higher-ranking visit was kept under
wraps. It has come to light only in a memoir by K.A. Pirogov, a “cultural-educational
officer” in the SAM division who attended a meeting with the high-ranking guest.
He indicates clearly that this was after the ambush of 3 August but before the cease-
fire began on the 7th:


We learned from our interpreters that hostilities were about to end and that ... Grechko
was flying out to visit us. Our meeting with the defense minister took place in Cairo, where
he visited the divizyon commanded by Lt-Col. A.D. Galkin. ... [He] thanked the personnel
for their excellent combat skills, for the job well done [and announced home leave for the
officers and noncoms, while enlisted men could enjoy a new R&R facility in Alexandria].
I was tasked to go there, to ensure communal cultural activities.^5

Grechko may have left before the missiles were advanced, but it would stretch the
imagination to suggest that this might have been done without his foreknowledge.

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