The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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SADAT PROVES HIS STABILITY AND LOYALTY


A. Early mentions and field testing of the MiG-25, 1968–70


In March 1971, Popov’s divizyon ended its year’s stint in Eg ypt. It was relieved by a
contingent that was drawn in November from the regional air defense formation at
Mariupol, Ukraine, and like its predecessors underwent training at Ashuluk. Its com-
mander, Col. Vasily Linkov, volunteered a detailed memoir to a Mariupol newspaper
in 2008. As he describes their dispatch, secrecy was somewhat eased: sailing on board
the liner Ivan Franko from Nikolaev, the men were still dressed in mufti but were
allowed to go on deck and even to “dance with the women of the ship’s crew.” The
ship was escorted by two submarines, which surfaced only off Alexandria. This was
not divulged to the rank-and-file: on a similar voyage in December 1970, a Strela
operator who was posted as a lookout on the bridge was alarmed when he spotted a
periscope, and alerted the captain, who said “take it easy, son—it’s ours and here to
protect us.”^1 Upon arrival, to prevent any Israeli attack, the Eg yptian pilot boats that
guided Linkov’s steamer dropped depth charges as they progressed along the channel
into the harbor.
Taking over from Popov near the canal, Linkov and his men already heard inflated
legends about the divizyon’s exploits. Despite the “temporary peace,” the SAMs’ outer
defenses of Shilkas and Strelas were posted daily before dawn up to 15–20 kilometers
away “in the most dangerous directions,” but at night the SAM crews took the risk of
turning off their systems to let them cool. Israeli planes approached the missiles’ range
up to twenty times a day, and Linkov considered that even though they turned back
when his radar acquired them, their purpose was to tire out the Soviet crews with
constant alerts.^2
The ceasefire-violation affair and the U-2 flights had emphasized the importance
of high-altitude photo surveillance. The Soviets had a suitable, though yet experimen-
tal, counter for the US spyplane—with the added advantage that unlike the U-2 or
the newer SR-71, it could be armed for combat missions too. The model that would
later be known as the MiG-25, NATO reporting name Foxbat, had already been used

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