THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973that the Soviet Union is abandoning friends ... when the war is about to begin.” The
latter statement very much describes the atmosphere in March 1971, which after the
“blink” in January soon returned to high suspense—while, as Akopov puts it,
“Soviet–American relations at that period of time [began] to develop.”^53 In sum, the
conflicting demands of Moscow’s position vis-à-vis other allies and its emerging
détente policy toward the United States both suggested and necessitated a combined
exercise: to offer a withdrawal, which it desired anyway, as a concession to the United
States—but to do so secretly.
Toward the Soviet advisers on the ground, however, the Eg yptian command’s only
complaint was again that the benefits of their advice were not being maximized. A
circular to the elements of the 16th Infantry Division pointed out that the advisers’
“output reports” had become perfunctory and routine, and did not reflect “ideas,
suggestions and experiments worthy of study and dissemination.” Field commanders
were instructed to “take advantage of [the advisers’] full capability and experience, ...
seek their advice and ask their opinion.” A form was provided for this purpose.^54
While interpretations of Soviet intent varied, the thrust of Soviet action soon
became clear. Sadat’s visit was immediately followed by a renewed sea- and airlift of
munitions—or rather, the appearance of reports about these shipments, which had
already begun. The Western media first identified additional MiG-21s, Su-7s and
SAMs, and a new variant of Shilka (ZSU-23–4V1) with improved radar and fire-
power. The most prominent new arrival was the Mi-8 assault helicopter, which was
described as suitable for commando raids (correctly, as their use in the Yom Kippur
War would prove). Three shiploads of the helicopters were reported by US intelli-
gence sources as unloaded during the month-long extension of the ceasefire, indicat-
ing that their supply was agreed before Sadat’s visit.^55
While even such distinctly offensive gear could be construed as part of a long-term
program, there were signs of more immediate preparations. US intelligence reported
that the USSR had undertaken an unusual effort to place a surveillance satellite over
the Middle East and monitor its photography by direct transmission rather than
delayed retrieval, the usual technique at the time.^56 Insufficient data received even by
this means was one rationale proposed a few weeks later for the most dramatic new
development, which was initially kept top secret: the dispatch to Eg ypt of an entire
new Soviet unit, with the most advanced aircraft.