The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

The reconnaissance-bomber version, MiG-25RB, was even newer. Bezhevets, at
the test facility at Akhtyubinsk on the Caspian Sea, was tasked only in 1969 to begin
urgent tests of high-altitude bombing that would utilize the MiG-25’s advanced
navigation systems. He reported very good results, and “understood that this was
meant for the Middle East.” His subordinate, Capt. Nikolay Borshchev—a pilot who
doubled as the 63rd’s political officer—stressed this newly developed feature when
he reminisced that upon the Foxbats’ arrival in Eg ypt,

they were attentively observed. All the Eg yptian personnel ran to the phones to report the

first flight to someone. Now it is known with what alarm Israeli intelligence monitored the

group’s action, especially the RBs [reconnaissance-bomber version] which could also bomb

any target in Israel or the occupied territories accurately and with impunity.

This was an exaggerated assessment of Israeli intelligence capability: six months
later, the IAF still believed that all four of the aircraft were of the “reconnai s-
sance type.”^4
Given that the 63rd had only two RBs, if they were readied to deliver only conven-
tional bombs these would have to be aimed at exceptionally sensitive targets in order
to pose a significant threat. Unlike the Foxbats’ next appearance in the theater, during
the Yom Kippur War, there is no mention in the numerous veterans’ accounts from
1971 to 1972 either of nuclear weapons for them or of Dimona as their projected
target. The IAF too was little concerned about, or even aware of, a possible bombing
function for the Foxbats. To the extent that they were seen as increasing the
Eg yptians’ offensive capability, it was in achieving air superiority.^5 But soon their
small number became apparent; as late as October 1971, the Israelis still overesti-
mated “the maximum figure” between six and twelve.^6 Even this number obviated the
original concerns that Foxbats would be pitted against Phantoms for dominating the
sky over the canal (which caused a flurry of comparisons between the two models’
performance). Only later was attention focused on the 63rd’s actual spying mission.
The Soviets’ preparations took two weeks. Before their departure, Bezhevets (with
Air Force chief Kutakhov) was summoned to a meeting with Grechko, indicating the
importance attached to their deployment. Accounts from this briefing reflect only a
reconnaissance mission, as well as the Marshal’s perennial concern: while he approved
flights over Israel at 20,000 meters and 2,800 kilometers per hour—calculated to
outperform any IAF interceptor—Grechko “categorically” forbade any closer
approach to Tel Aviv than 40 kilometers, as there would be “a lot of noise” if a plane
or pilot fell into Israeli hands. Bezhevets, correctly foreseeing the tactic that the
Israelis would devise, tried to suggest that the MiG-25s take off from Eg ypt, fly
straight across Israel and land in Syria. If they doubled back to Eg ypt, he argued, even
slower IAF planes could meet them head-on. Grechko swept this idea aside:
“Colonel, [expletive], do I need to put another division in Syria to guard them?” No
one ever dared to broach the idea again.