THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973ordered him to desist. Nixon pointed out that the United States had more to gain
from tilting its policy toward 100 million Arabs than two million Israelis.
Maintaining Israeli military superiority was in the US interest so long as Soviet influ-
ence in Eg ypt and other Arab states remained strong. But once Soviet forces left Eg ypt
a radically different policy would be required. Nixon stated that he would not sup-
port the State Department initiative until after the US election, and by that time
Soviet arms shipments might make an Arab–Israeli war inevitable.^4 In other words,
removing the Soviet presence remained a central and urgent aim, but it would have
to be achieved directly with Moscow rather than by virtue of a US-brokered
Eg yptian–Israeli accord.
Sadat, then, had chosen the wrong messenger, and his offer went nowhere—for the
time being. The Soviets would repeat it in September, and the fact that they made,
almost verbatim, the same distinction between combat troops and advisers indicates
that they too were responding, in coordination, to Kissinger’s signal.
B. Sadat foils a “pro-Soviet” coup but signs a treaty with Moscow
On 13 May 1971, within two weeks of meeting Rogers, Sadat foiled a coup against
him (or engineered a preemptive countercoup), and any remaining doubts about the
stability of his government were removed. Vice-President Sabry, chef de cabinet Sami
Sharaf and Defense Minister Fawzy topped a list of figures with pro-Soviet reputa-
tions who were ousted and jailed. Ambassador Vinogradov was even rumored to have
engineered the attempted coup himself, which strengthened expectations for an
anti-Soviet backlash in Eg ypt.^5 But he remained at his post, no mention was made of
any Soviet context in public statements, and speculations that an anti-Moscow swing
was the hidden agenda were soon disproved. One unrelated result was that Sharaf was
replaced by his underling Marwan, about whose role in suppressing the conspiracy
against Sadat there are wildly divergent versions; in any case, his promotion and
heightened proximity to Sadat increased his perceived value for Israeli intelligence.^6
The very day columnist James Reston was told in Washington that “Rogers estab-
lished a good personal relationship with Sadat,” US officialdom was “surprised” by
the arrival of Soviet head of state Podgorny for another visit to Cairo.^7 It produced a
friendship and cooperation treaty. According to Ambassador Vinogradov, the pact
was requested by Sadat and the text was prepared by the Eg yptians.^8 Western pundits
were forced to conclude that the power struggle in Eg ypt had been personal or
domestic—and in foreign affairs, connected to the newly announced federation with
Syria and Libya rather than to relations with the USSR.^9
Meeting Dobrynin on 8 June, Kissinger reported that the Soviet ambassador
gloated: “We can always prevent a settlement if you push us to it. We got a 15-year
treaty out of the Rogers visit.” Kissinger had to backpedal: “I said it was not our
policy to push the S[oviet] U[nion] out of the Middle East. Politically, though, some