TRIAL BALLOONS FROM BOTH SIDESthe Israelis felt the same, since the guest’s visit was at the Soviets’ behest. Primakov’s
memoir highlights a military aspect of this talk. Meir, he writes, lost her calm
demeanor in the heated conversation:
“If there is a war, we’ll fight that war,” she said. “If any aircraft get in our way, we’ll shoot
them down” ... I asked her: “Could you clarify whose aircraft you intend to shoot down?”
... Meir could tell from my reaction that she had gone too far. Hurriedly, she reiterated the
importance of Israel’s dialogue with the Soviet Union.If indeed Meir caught herself misspeaking, it may not have been due to Primakov’s
response but out of anxiety that she had given away a military secret. As the Soviet
MiG-21s in Eg ypt had seen no action since the ceasefire, she almost certainly referred
to the continuing Foxbat flights over Sinai and Israel, which remained a serious con-
cern, and to the countermeasures that the IAF was close to perfecting (or so it
believed). It would be another month before Israel confirmed that it was being over-
flown by Soviet pilots in advanced craft, and Meir did not press the issue—of which
she was undoubtedly aware—as a test of Soviet goodwill.
Her outburst, however, elicited another barely concealed threat from Primakov,
which he repeated twice to Baron over lunch: “This kind of expression is hard to
accept. [You] must remember that the Soviet Union is a very mighty power and even
the United States would not use such language.” Primakov recounted it even more
strongly in his memoir: “Baron got nervous when I mentioned” Golda’s statement.
“Doesn’t she understand how we will respond, or does she think the United States
will intervene at risk of nuclear war?” Baron could only admit “of course not.” The
centrality of the overflight matter to Primakov would be reflected in his next round
of talks with Israeli officials in October.
The Soviet emissary then requested, and received, a meeting with Dayan. Besides the
defense minister’s aforementioned reference to NATO, this may have been connected
with Dayan’s reputed openness to an interim settlement, or—conversely—with his call,
a few days before Primakov’s arrival, for Israel to function as a “permanent government”
in the occupied territories.^37 The Soviets may also have been testing an Arab trial bal-
loon whereby an “Israeli-born Jew”—specifically Dayan, as distinct from his immigrant
colleagues—might be acceptable as a negotiating partner.^38 Whatever Primakov’s
motives, the transcript of their talk shows that the emissary was much more solicitous
than in his previous talks, not to say fawning. He flattered Dayan as “a man who says
what he thinks,” and repeatedly responded “that is very important” to the defense min-
ister’s clarifications of his cryptic or contradictory statements.^39
Already briefed about Primakov’s ire at Meir’s aircraft-shootdown remark, Dayan
soothed him that Israel “was anxious to avoid any kind of confrontation with Soviet
military personnel in Eg ypt and that the Israeli air force have been given orders to
that effect.” However, when Dayan blamed the Soviets for the direct air clashes a year