THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973later taken captive. The system was never activated, and the IDF dismissed Eg yptian
claims after the war that this was because their commandos disabled it.^2 But the
Soviets’ preparations do illustrate their constant refinement of canal-crossing plans.
The Soviets’ commitment to maintaining and improving the SAM shield across
the canal was demonstrated in the first major air incident since the ceasefire. On
11 September 1971, an “accurate machinegun burst” from an Israeli position on the
east bank brought down a low-flying Su-7, the first such loss since such flights were
resumed a half year before. The plane came down in the marshes of the northern
sector and was not recovered, so that its pilot could only be assumed as Eg yptian.^3
The Soviet personnel in Eg ypt were also informed “orally” that “one of our planes,
flown by an Eg yptian pilot” had been shot down.^4
The same day saw a replay of the March 1970 mid-air collision between US and
Soviet aircraft—this time closer to the Eg yptian–Israeli front. Corporal Aleksandr
Mitrokhin, an aircraft mechanic, was posted at the end of January 1971 to a squadron
of Tu-16R electronic-warfare planes based at Aswan.^5 He recalls an incident reported
by one of their crews, whose mission was to provide electronic interference “cover”
for an Eg yptian reconnaissance sortie into Sinai. “The crew of the Soviet Tu-16
waited for the Eg yptian to return, but he did not reappear at the scheduled time, so
ground-control ordered the Tu-16R to make one more pass.”
While turning around over the Mediterranean, their craft was intercepted by a US Sixth
Fleet Phantom. Coming to very close quarters, the F-4 crew began photographing our
machine—which, by the way, was done routinely. After banking on the left wing, [our]
crew could not see the American fighter. But banking right, they felt an impact. The
Phantom, after dropping a few hundred meters, leveled off and disappeared toward the sea.After the Soviet plane returned to Aswan, “examination of the right wing flaps
found a dent, scratches, and traces of paint.” The incident can be dated to
11 September, as Mitrokhin added, “the unfortunate Eg yptian reconnaissance pilot
had not, in fact, returned because he was shot down by Israeli anti-aircraft fire.”
The Tu-16’s “minimal damage was carefully repaired, but the confrontation was to
be continued. During the next sortie ... the situation was repeated. This time the F-4
crew seemed to be paying special attention to the right wing flap of our plane. Our
crew had a few very unpleasant moments.”^6 As in the previous case of a US–Soviet
encounter, this incident was not publicized. Nor was another with the IAF, as
described by Nikolay Bondarchuk, a former communications officer with the same
Soviet squadron. He recalled that “his Tu-16R was intercepted by an Israeli F-4
Phantom which made what might have been a simulated attack. This was, however,
driven off and there were no further Israeli interceptions.”^7
When Israeli officials met Primakov again in Vienna on 8 October, a month after
the Su-7 shootdown, they pointed out that such a lucky shot could only have been
scored point blank while the plane flew “right over our strongpoints.” Primakov