The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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FOREWORD

xxvii


How in the fiery Arabian desert
We suffered thirst and yearning.
We defended the fellah’s home and life
But no one ever thanked us.
No one but Allah knew
How it was there and what happened.
And there, in the sands on the Suez Canal
It was as any war is:
Fate did not spare my comrades,
But commanded me to remember them.
And to my last day I’ll recall them
Whose life they gave for the struggle
Let the Afganets, my friend and heir,
Sing about their fate and his.
Vasily Murzintsev, “No One Knew”^49

Interviews with the veterans or articles they contributed appeared in a wide range
of print, broadcast and online news media ranging as far as corporate house organs
and obscure regional papers. This was often in order to highlight local heroes on such
military-oriented occasions as Army Day or the commemoration of victory in the
“Great Patriotic War.”
Even the books—which usually had print runs as small as a few hundred cop-
ies—and certainly the newspaper and electronic platforms were often ephemeral. It
is only because we monitored this literature as it developed that we managed to
assemble what we believe is one of the largest collections, and to introduce it as a
source into Western scholarship. Its value was soon recognized: as Fredrik Logevall
wrote in 2008, “Admittedly, key archival documentation remains under lock and key
and will be inaccessible for a long time to come ... But enough material is available, in
the form of declassified documents, memoirs, oral histories and journalistic treat-
ments, to begin to piece together the story.”^50
The following pages will further illustrate what a wealth of insights and detailed
information this reservoir of material offered, as well as the criteria we had to develop
for evaluating its reliability, while allowing for such inherent risks as self-glorification,
selective memory and hearsay. Thanks to their sheer number, overlapping descrip-
tions from unrelated writers bear out their overall authenticity. They are most reliable
in respect of what the writers actually did or witnessed; their perceptions of the
overarching political or strategic considerations and decisions are less trustworthy in
factual terms, but are noteworthy in themselves as reflections of what was rumored
among the troops or was imparted to them by their politruks (political officers).
As a rule, the higher the writer’s rank at the time, the stronger his knowledge of
and commitment to the official line, though some of the senior officers are remark-

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