FLEXING MUSCLES WHILE OFFERING A PULLBACKgeneral.^41 Only when the events of July 1972 are recounted in Chapter XXX does
Kissinger state (truthfully enough) that he balked at the demand to openly declare the
outlines of the final settlement, at least until after the US presidential election.^42
But the chapter is entitled “Sadat Expels the Soviets,” even though Kissinger was
obviously aware that this was at best an exaggeration.^43 And the Dobrynin/Kissinger
reports show that the Soviet withdrawal offer did remain under intense discussion
throughout the preparations for the summit. Moreover, the American side in effect
acknowledged the Soviet contention that Nixon and Gromyko had reached an
understanding on the withdrawal offer and its conditions, and the Soviets constantly
urged the Americans to deliver their side of the deal—which they knew Nixon and
Kissinger would not or could not do.
C. Another round of threats from Primakov
Gromyko’s report on his White House talks on 29 September was designated for
circulation down to candidate members of the Politburo. In a paper for wider dis-
semination, the foreign minister stated only that Nixon “specifically had in mind
what the US side had said regarding the presence of Soviet military personnel in
Eg ypt,” making it look as if Nixon raised the issue, and omitting Gromyko’s own
initiative.^44 So Primakov, arriving for his talks with the Israelis in Vienna on
8 October, was apparently not privy to the withdrawal offer, as indicated also by his
flat rejection of any demand to relinquish Soviet “positions” in Eg ypt. Meeting Baron
and an official from the Prime Minister’s Office, Mordechai Gazit, Primakov again
took elaborate precautions to ensure secrecy, such as demanding to move into another
room from the one that was booked by the Israelis, and to turn on a radio.
Either Primakov’s initially moderate instructions were altered after US receptive-
ness to Gromyko’s proposal reduced the urgency of rapprochement with Israel—or
he simply ignored them. According to Israeli minutes, Primakov actually resorted to
almost-naked intimidation, using nearly the exact language that Brezhnev would use
the next July: “It is a secret to no one that we do not wish to be involved and we want
to avoid such a necessity. [But] it is entirely clear that ... such a situation may develop
in which we cannot stand by.” Repeating the charge that “we supplied Eg ypt with the
air defense system only after your depth bombings,” he alluded to continuing “Arab
pressure for more procurement, especially offensive aircraft.” Again referring to
NATO, despite Dayan’s clarification, he told the Israelis: “you are part of the military
array of a country that—by its own definition—is in a state of war with us. ...
Whatever your intentions may be, the results of your policy (and policy means deeds)
are undoubtedly detrimental for us.”
Primakov harked back to Meir’s unguarded statement and responded with a coun-
terthreat that hardly seems to refer to a merely theoretical conflict: “If such state-
ments are repeated, ... to the effect that ‘Israel wants peace but we’ll shoot down any