THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973UN General Assembly on the 20th, Eban complained that this development was not
getting adequate attention in the United States, where “a struggle still continues” for
Israel to get more F-4s.^53 Meanwhile, the IAF was attempting to make do with what
it had: Hod disclosed to Momyer a new stratagem that was being devised. It was just
what Bezhevets, the Foxbat commander, had feared: coming at the MiG-25 head-on
when it doubled back toward Eg ypt. As Momyer reported it:
One F-4 attempts a head-on zoom pass, realizing it can’t get up to the Foxbat, but tactic is
designed to encourage Foxbat to make a turn to evade AIM-4 missile. If Foxbat turns, Hod
claims it will loose [sic] five to ten thousand feet and three or four hundred knots. This
would then give one of the F-4s best position to launch a zoom climb attack on advantage.
[I] questioned the loss in performance of the Foxbat ... I suspect instructions to Soviet
Foxbats are “to keep up the speed and altitude until over water or friendly land since noth-
ing can get up to your altitude.”^54Some of this apparently leaked, as there was soon discussion in the Israeli media of
missiles that might allow IAF Phantoms to hit a Foxbat even from lower altitude.^55
But within a few days, on 6 November, the IAF still was unable to challenge a flight
by two Foxbats down the middle of Sinai. This time, the IDF issued an official com-
muniqué about the incursion. Again, it was considered important enough to discuss
in cabinet the next day, “as the planes might have gathered much information on the
IDF’s disposition.”^56 Renewed supply of Phantoms was still not forthcoming, and the
Israelis resentfully stressed that the Foxbats’ impunity posed a challenge to US tech-
nolog y as well as marking an escalation of the Soviets’ regional role. In Congress,
demands intensified to restore the military balance, which had been tipped by the
Foxbats’ appearance.^57 By 2 January 1972, a month after this item led a “shopping list”
that Meir presented in Washington, Nixon confirmed in a television interview
reports that eighteen more F-4s would be supplied, but as yet with no timetable.
On 17 January, Brezhnev reminded Nixon: “as before, we are prepared in real
earnest to find concrete solutions on the basis of the principles set forth in that con-
versation [with Gromyko]. ... It is desirable to act without delay.”^58 Four days later,
Dobrynin reported that Kissinger “confirmed their readiness to try and prepare ... for
the meeting in Moscow” the US thoughts on both the interim and the permanent
settlement “in the spirit of what Nixon and A.A. Gromyko discussed.”^59 Kissinger, on
the other hand, reported to Nixon that he told Dobrynin in the same talk (which
went on for four hours “in an atmosphere of effusive cordiality, buttressed by slugs of
vodka and cans of caviar”) that it had been impossible to continue discussing the
Soviet proposal “without talking with the Israelis at least in general terms, because
their intelligence was so good.” Kissinger said he and Nixon had finally obtained from
Meir “some concrete proposals” that permitted continuing discussion of an interim
settlement, with a “good possibility” of concluding it at the summit if both sides took
no military action. Dobrynin agreed and said Soviet influence was being applied in