THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Bezhevets’s daring flight took place on 3 February—the day after Sadat arrived in
Moscow for a visit that Heikal described as “one of the most important and delicate
in the history of Arab–Soviet relations,” after a public exchange of recriminations
about the Soviets’ purportedly lukewarm support for Eg ypt’s war plans.^62 After it
ended, Victor Louis was fielded again to spread word that “Russia is now evidently
anxious to avert war in the Middle East,” whereas China “is fomenting it in order to
disturb President Nixon’s visit.” This was interpreted in “diplomatic quarters” in
London to the effect that “Moscow has all but vetoed a major Eg yptian military
operation against Israel.”^63
The setting was thus similar to that of the Foxbat flight over Dimona on 26 May
1967, while Eg yptian Defense Minister Badran was locked in negotiations in
Moscow over whether Eg ypt should be cleared to attack Israel first, or should wait for
an Israeli strike as the Soviets demanded. As it did then, an ostentatious overflight of
the Israeli heartland again served as a gesture to prove Soviet support. It came a few
weeks after the IAF magazine published a report belittling the Foxbat’s performance
and suggesting that even Mirages, never mind Phantoms, could overcome it—evi-
dently based on the plans Hod had revealed to Momyer.^64
Bezhevets, covered as usual with a dense formation of MiG-21s on takeoff,
approached from the sea to within 29 kilometers of downtown Tel Aviv and then
crossed Sinai unhindered, “upending all the Israeli defensive array.” As always, two
copies of his films were made, one for the Eg yptians and one for immediate dispatch
to the Soviet General Staff. “His photos showed every house. The Eg yptians pointed
out Prime Minister Meir’s. The flight took only 50 minutes but made a lot of noise.”
Abramov writes that Bar-Lev was sacked as IDF chief of staff “for not having assured
air defense of the capital. But what could he have done?”^65
This claim is spurious, but the description of concern within the Israeli military
was accurate enough: this time nothing about the flight was released in Israel or
reported anywhere.^66 Since the US decision to supply more Phantoms had already
been announced (and denounced by Pravda), decrying the Soviets’ advantage in the
air was no longer necessary for putting pressure on Washington, and the effect on
domestic morale evidently was now the Israelis’ overriding consideration for the news
blackout.^67 So the reports about Sadat’s disappointment in Moscow were not chal-
lenged by news of the continuing Soviet support for his war preparations.