The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

Kissinger remarked ... with noticeable hesitation, that Israeli intelligence “has very good

sources of information in the highest circles of the Eg yptian government.” If Sadat finds

out ... from the Soviet side, he might share this information “with a certain circle of indi-

viduals, from where it could go further, to Israel” ... This is the first time Kissinger has

mentioned Israeli agents in direct proximity to Sadat. It is hard for us to judge the reli-

ability of this information here (it could also be some kind of disinformation), but we

think it necessary to point out this remark.^3

So it is rather rich that Kissinger’s memoirs claim he stood up at this meeting for
Israel’s security interests. He was almost certainly referring to Ashraf Marwan, who
by now had been passing information or disinformation to the Mossad for over two
years. During her talks in Washington in early December, Meir had presented Nixon
and Kissinger with the transcript of the Brezhnev–Sadat talks in October that
Marwan had provided. Mossad chief had given another copy to CIA Director Helms,
whose experts confirmed (or fell for) its authenticity. Congratulating Zamir on this
achievement, Meir considered that sharing it helped move Nixon toward resuming
Phantom sales. According to Israeli informants quoted by Bar-Joseph, the document’s
source was not named to the Americans, but it could only be a member of Sadat’s
entourage.^4
Presumably, Dobrynin had not been informed previously about Marwan’s activity;
the “Center” in Moscow almost certainly was—but even if the Soviets relayed
Kissinger’s tip to Eg ypt it only confirmed Marwan’s success. In any event, his continu-
ing role in the crucial events of 1972 and ’73 shows that he was not compromised by
Kissinger’s disclosure—another clue that Marwan’s services for the Israelis were
staged by Eg ypt. In March 1973, an expert visitor to Eg ypt still listed “Mirwan” first
among “three men reportedly closest to Sadat.”^5

B. The SAM-3s’ handover begins

In the meantime, the very discussion of an agreed withdrawal was kept so secret—or
the disinformation campaign in Cairo, which would go into high gear after the deal’s
implementation, was launched so early—that even the CIA was taken in. A secret
intelligence memorandum ten days after the Kissinger–Dobrynin talk still described
“frictions” in Soviet–Eg yptian relations, which “spawn recurrent reports that some
or all Soviet personnel will be expelled from Eg ypt.”^6
There were indeed some frictions, and after Sadat’s ultimate break with Moscow
these could be interpreted retrospectively as omens. Vladimir Ivanov, then in charge
of manpower on chief military adviser Okunev’s staff, wrote a strongly anti-Eg yptian
memoir in 2001. In “early 1972,” Ivanov claims, the Eg yptians’ command issued
“order no. 200” proclaiming high alert in preparation for a cross-canal offensive.
“Okunev, in my presence, discussed this with the EAF’s commander ... and its chief-
of-staff Mubarak” and stipulated that pilots should be confined to bases to ensure