The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

price. On the last day of the conference, he finally gave in to the Soviets’ demand to
formulate a separate, secret agreement on “general principles” for the region. In the
1979 volume of his memoirs, Kissinger published the text of this document for the
first time—but he relegated it to a footnote, and dismissed its importance almost as
totally as that of the communiqué:

inexplicably, Gromyko spent four hours with me trying to agree on “general principles” ...

I conducted what was in effect a delaying tactic. ... They were so vague as to leave wide

scope for negotiation. ... Their practical significance was to confirm the deadlock. ... The

Soviets never pressed them. Neither did we.^4

This is where Kissinger’s memoirs go beyond mere omission and approach outright
misstatement. William Quandt, writing in 1993, already questioned this version: “my
impression is that Kissinger took the exercise somewhat more seriously, and almost
certainly Nixon did. ... The principles did not simply parrot UN resolutions, as
Kissinger implies.”^5 Quandt’s doubts have since been confirmed by the transcript of
Kissinger’s talk with Gromyko, in which the “general principles” were finalized. It
clarifies why, if the principles were as bland as Kissinger claimed, he demanded to
conceal them from Rogers, from the Eg yptians, and most of all from the Israelis. “I
can assure you this paper would create an explosion in Jerusalem,” Kissinger told
Gromyko.^6 Toward the end of two long bargaining sessions, he remarked again: “both
of us are terrified of what our allies would do. This is the best guarantee of secrecy.”
But Kissinger had already agreed that Sadat was to be informed, so he had no
reason to expect an angry response from the Eg yptians. He did have good cause to
fear an Israeli backlash: among other points of the permanent settlement, the hag-
gling ended with a major concession by Kissinger on the notorious ambiguity of
Resolution 242, in its various translations, in respect of the withdrawal to be
demanded from Israel.

Mr [Georg y] Korniyenko [Head of US Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry]: The Foreign

Minister is saying that the content of this phrase means the Arab territories.

For. Min. Gromyko: “A l l .”

Dr Kissinger: “The.” I understand the content the Foreign Minister is giving this principle,

and I do not dispute it. ... When I go back, I will say there are no secret agreements.

For. Min. Gromyko: We agree.^7

The secret agreement that, of course, had been reached thus comprised—beyond
the written “general principles”—some oral understandings. These were evidently
completed when “the Foreign Minister and Dr Kissinger then adjourned ... for an
extended discussion,” which was not recorded. They presumably included the imple-
mentation of the Soviet offer of troop withdrawal, which for Kissinger had been the
original purpose of the whole exercise.