PA RT 4
“WE PREPARED THE WAR”
This point on the timeline—late 1972 or very early 1973—is where scrutiny must begin
in order to answer another question that has been as vexing for historians as it was for
national actors at the time. This is whether and to what extent the Soviet Union col-
luded with Eg ypt, as well as Syria, in initiating, timing and conducting the Yom Kippur
War. The following chapters seek to delineate the continuity to this war from the vari-
ous elements of previous Soviet involvement. Discussion will center, therefore, on the
opening phases of the war and those subsequent features of Soviet action that clearly
cannot be attributed to ad hoc response to unforeseen developments.
In Putin’s Russia, it has become politically correct to describe the October 1973
surprise attack as “one of the most brilliant operations conceived by Soviet military
advisers and their Arab friends.”^1 But most Western scholarship has been slow to aban-
don the official Soviet line, as laid down by Brezhnev at the CPSU CC plenum in
September 1974. “The speech was read out at Party assemblies ... He criticized Sadat
and explained that the USSR did not know about Sadat’s planned operation.”^2
Even semi-official Russian histories have conceded by now that in fact “the USSR
was informed about its Arab allies’ intent.”^3 Assad’s sympathetic biographer Patrick
Seale went a step further: “did the Soviets know the October War was coming?
Obviously, yes. Did they help in its planning? The answer must also be yes, to the
extent that Arab arms requirements were worked out with Soviet experts on the basis
of specific military plans.”^4 The questions of general foreknowledge and essential
material support have, then, become moot. What must still be addressed are the
issues of practical collusion in preparing the war—by both military moves and decep-
tion efforts—and direct participation in its conduct.
The usual focus on the very last days before the Eg yptian–Syrian attack on
6 October necessarily highlighted the mass evacuation of Soviet civilians, including
the dependents of military advisers, from Eg ypt and Syria that was ostensibly impro-
vised on the shortest notice on the 4th. It was taken to indicate that Moscow was
previously unaware at least of the zero hour for the offensive, and that it was so reluc-
tant to get involved that it was willing even to compromise the advantage of surprise