“WE CAN’T CONTROL THE ARABS BUT MUST SUPPORT THEM”handed him a reminder that his excuses had expired, and a warning of the conse-
quences for détente:
Time is passing while the situation in the Middle East remains complicated and dangerous.
If effective measures are not taken the events there can get out of control. ... Further exis-
tence of the deadlock in the settlement, for which Israel is to blame, cannot but force the
Arab countries to seek a way out along the lines of using military methods ... no matter
what would be the attitude of others to it.^14This would become the consistent Soviet line: Moscow could not control its Arab
allies, but would be constrained to support them if Israeli intransigence compelled
them to fight. The “expulsion” had thus absolved the Soviets of responsibility without
weakening their commitment to an Arab military option.
King Hussein of Jordan said as much to Kissinger:
the Eg yptians’ expulsion of the Soviet advisors ... removed the Soviet presence from possible
direct involvement in any resumption of armed conflict between the Eg yptians and the
Israelis, [but] it also increased the danger of President Sadat perhaps heating up the situation
on his own. ... Indeed, we have heard from President Sadat himself that such are his inten-
tions. ... The Soviet policy in the area, following the relative deterioration of their position in
Eg ypt, appears to be one of ... saving what they could of their presence in Eg ypt.^15Hussein thus helped to propagate the “dualistic” view of “reluctant” Soviet support
for Sadat’s war aims. The asymmetry in superpower–client relations was exemplified
when Rogers told the Jordanian king—rather pathetically—that the “only problem
we have in our relations with Arabs is Israel. Otherwise, we get along fine with Arabs
... much better than Soviets do.”^16
B. Watergate foils Nixon’s plot against Kissinger
Nixon claimed in his memoirs that at this point “I spoke to Henry about the need to
get going on the Mideast.”
What he’s afraid is that Rogers, et al. will get ahold of the issue and ... that it will break
down. ... Henry has constantly put off moving on it ... but I am determined to bite this
bullet ... because we just can’t let the thing ride ... providing a fishing ground not only for
radicals but, of course, for the Soviets.^17Nixon’s Oval Office tapes confirm that the president considered removing
Kissinger entirely from the Middle Eastern brief. Speaking with the White House
chief of staff, Kissinger’s former NSC deputy Alexander Haig, Nixon objected mainly
to “Henry’s” reluctance to confront Israel and its US supporters, which might encour-
age Meir to attack Eg ypt:
Henry’s filibustered the Mideast for almost four years too, because he is totally attacking
what the Jewish agenda wants. ... We’ve got to take it. We can’t let State handle the