“WE CAN’T CONTROL THE ARABS BUT MUST SUPPORT THEM”His talks were described as following up on those of Lashchenko’s delegation,
which was now openly reported to have discussed the details of a new arms deal. To
the extent that Ahmed Ismail’s mission was covered in the more attentive Israeli press,
it revived speculation that
some Soviet advisers are expected to return to Eg ypt ... to handle the maintenance of deli-
cate and highly sophisticated equipment that Eg ypt will apparently receive. ... The USSR
and Eg ypt will be checking close up some severe logistical problems [that may arise] in case
an “interim” political settlement permits Eg ypt to send troops across the canal.^37But the specific Eg yptian desiderata were more in line with a hostile crossing. The
Soviets were correctly reported as still refusing Eg yptian demands to acquire Foxbats,
but contemplating an offer of some other new model instead; this possibly referred
to the Su-17s whose supply had already begun. Incorrectly, as it soon transpired, the
Soviets were still supposed to be withholding Scud missiles.^38 Some Eg yptian sources
date the Soviet agreement to provide Scuds and even the start of their delivery at “the
beginning of 1973”—that is, Ahmed Ismail did clinch this deal in Moscow.^39
Even the proud official Eg yptian military history of the October War concedes
that the technical efforts of Eg yptian industry only provided half the volume of
equipment that was now received from the USSR.^40 As radio-technical expert
“Smirnov” noted, in early 1973 “the Arabs began to get serious about integrating the
new Soviet weapons. ... They also had a self-produced submachinegun called the Port
Said, a crude wood-and-metal contraption that our specialists ridiculed: ‘perhaps it
can kill at 30 meters but the maximum range is 50.’” He observed that “more and
more often, among the desert dunes soldiers could be seen drilling, with the stress on
storming an enemy strongpoint in rough desert surroundings. They all had new
Kalashnikovs, and every third man had an RPG”—an emphasis on infantry anti-tank
capability that would have momentous impact in October. “The shooting attested
that they were not sparing ammunition,” “Smirnov” observed, adding that similar
preparations were under way in other Eg yptian services.^41
Israel learned “in early 1973” that the new arms deal had been made and that it
included bridging and fording equipment, additional SAMs (mainly SAM-6s) and
electronics.^42 Eg yptian air defense—as one of its Soviet advisers relates—had since
the “temporary peace in 1971,” when “the issue of liberating Sinai came onto the
agenda,” begun preparations to advance the SAM array across the canal.^43 However,
the dismissive attitude in Israel was reflected by the head of MI research when he
claimed, even after the 1973 war, that “in February the Eg yptians didn’t even know
what plane to ask for ... they didn’t know what types of plane existed in the USSR.”^44
On Ahmed Ismail’s way back to Cairo, it was announced that he stopped in
Damascus.^45 Other sources put this visit in mid-February—that is, before Ismail’s visit
to Moscow—and claim that he then proposed three dates for war with Israel, of