“WE CAN’T CONTROL THE ARABS BUT MUST SUPPORT THEM”Kremlinolog y experts. The brunt of opinion before the war was that the Soviet Union has
no interest in a war, because if there were to be one, Eg ypt would be routed and [the
Soviets] would be faced with a very painful choice.^52The lack of formal relations did not prevent “Soviet low-level approaches to Israeli
representatives in various capitals ... continuing roughly once a month.” On
21 March, the Foreign Ministry’s Soviet affairs director, Avigdor Dagan, told a US
“embassy official” that these “approaches invariously were clumsy and pointless ...
Soviets involved all seemed to be KGB agents.” The Israelis were puzzled. Dagan
“could not discern any serious line currently in USSR’s posture,” except “warning to
the Arabs not to trust Washington,” and possibly an attempt to discourage “flirtation
with Peking.”^53
This assessment hardly changed after Primakov again met Gazit and Baron of
Prime Minister Meir’s office on 22–6 March 1973, at a house arranged by the Israelis
in the outskirts of Vienna. This time he was accompanied or minded by Yu.V. Kotov,
“a top foreign intelligence analyst.”^54 Primakov reported home that the Israeli leader-
ship was approaching acceptance of an interim solution to include the canal opening,
and was even ready to accept withdrawal to “interim positions.” However, the Israelis
still rejected a prior timetable for complete withdrawal from all the territories, and
wanted the Americans to arrange direct talks with Sadat. “Gazit tried to display dis-
interest in any Soviet role in an interim settlement,” which Primakov claims he knew
had already been agreed with Washington. Most importantly, he reported, “the
Israelis are completely confident of their military superiority, do not expect any Arab
operations, and envisage an extended period to exploit Arab divisions in order to
maintain their own negativism.”
Primakov’s memoir implies that internal Soviet rivalries doomed the option he
explored of resuming diplomatic relations, and the Israelis did not press for it
urgently. “No Soviet leader would risk a personal decision to change the formula,”
which allowed for resumption only after the reasons for the 1967 rupture were
removed: the territories restored and Palestinian rights upheld including a state.
Compromise might mean being charged with “acquiescence in assisting the aggres-
sor.” Andropov and his foreign intelligence supported resuming relations (which
would permit the return of “legal” agents to Israel), Gromyko vacillated, and
Brezhnev “didn’t oppose” it, but others were against. So while a report by Andropov
and Gromyko included a proposal “to tell the Israelis that we might consider their
suggestion to enlarge their interests section at the Dutch embassy,” even this gesture
was dropped from the ultimate Politburo resolution on 18 April. The Israelis, for
their part, as Primakov complains, dragged their feet on a proposal for another round
of talks in Vienna in June.^55
Gazit was now director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, replacing Simcha
Dinitz, who left for Washington to take up Rabin’s post as ambassador. In his first
meeting with Kissinger, Dinitz “surprised” the latter with a report on the “new”