The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

ments, the joint Eg yptian–Syrian command went on to promulgate its directive (on
15 September), and reserve mobilization was begun (two days later).^67 Operational
coordination “was completed at the army level” on 13 September. The same day, an
Israeli air patrol west of the Syrian ports of Latakiya and Tartus (which also housed
Soviet naval facilities) spotted Soviet ships unloading tanks, artillery and missiles. A
Syrian attempt to intercept the patrol triggered a massive dogfight, in which the
Syrians lost thirteen planes to Israel’s one.^68
Perhaps in order to dodge responsibility for the disastrous engagement of
13 September, the Soviet adviser to the Syrian Air Force chief, Gen. Vagin, claims
that his advisee Naji did not seek his counsel in advance. But afterward, Vagin “was
entrusted even with absolutely secret information”:

I knew the date for launching military operations against Israel two weeks in advance. Naji

told me: “but you must tell no one.” But how could I tell no one? Of course I reported to

the chief adviser, but stressed that the source should not be exposed. Every one of ours

understood at the time how important this was. ... Why did he tell me? A plan had to be

developed for air strikes. For two weeks I wrangled with him which targets should be

struck and what order of forces should be involved. Finally he did see reason, and the plan

turned out successful.

Or at least more successful than on 13 September; Vagin argued against an attack
on Israeli airbases, where he reckoned that interceptors on thirty-second alert would
already be airborne, and instead suggested targeting air defense control centers on the
Golan Heights.^69 Even in the unlikely case that the Soviets were not informed at a
higher level about the Alexandria council’s decision, this source puts them in the
know on 22 September at the latest.
One consequence of Syria’s temporizing on the date might have worked in Israel’s
favor: it delayed the war until after the IDF had completed, in September, the devel-
opment and fabrication of one improved and one completely new bridging system.
However, a training facility on the Mediterranean coast was not yet ready, the equip-
ment and personnel were untried, and these innovations were of little effect when
they were needed. The ultimate Israeli canal crossing that determined the war’s out-
come was accomplished only thanks to “heroic” improvisation.