The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

redeployment of MiG-25s.^42 There are several indications that Soviet combat pilots
already in Eg ypt as advisers, or instructors inducting new aircraft, were expected to
go into combat and possibly even did. MI had prior information whereby the
Eg yptians were instructed that “in the event that the Soviet pilots do not wish to fly
in the war, the Eg yptians will fight without them”—that is, they were expected to
fight.^43 Toward the end of the war, the State Department recorded “a report from an
Israeli Air Force pilot that the IAF had captured two Soviet MiG pilots.”^44
This is one of several references to Soviet POWs being taken by the IDF, which—
as in 1967—were never officially confirmed. A reserve paratrooper in the Israeli force
that closed in on Suez City from the southwest in the final stage of the war related
that in one of the bunkers his unit mopped up,

I moved a big curtain aside with the barrel of my Uzi, and there were about 15 men,

Eg yptian soldiers and four or five Soviet officers, in Soviet uniforms with insignia. I’m not

sure whether they were armed—maybe with pistols. They all surrendered quietly. The

Soviets tried to speak with us in English. ... As best I know, they were in command of

missile batteries. Later, in beach villas on the outskirts of Suez that looked like fancy living

quarters, we found radios that were constantly receiving signals in Russian. We only under-

stood some Russian curses.^45

This account conforms to those of Soviet signal- and missilemen—regular crews
as well as advisers—who were sent to Eg ypt and Syria just before the war or at its
outbreak. Israeli field officers reported extreme difficulty in command and control
due to much-improved jamming of their units’ frequencies. They attributed this to
the Soviets.^46 This was evident from the very outset, as the head of the IDF’s Southern
Command testified: “on Saturday [6 October, there was] very little, on Sunday very
much, and on Monday nearly everything” was jammed, even systems that were con-
sidered relatively immune.^47

C. Zenitchiki redeployed

As for air defense units, about 18 October, “Kosygin, in Cairo, ordered 300 Russians
to fly immediately to Eg ypt to stiffen the air defense barrier, as he feared Israeli
raids.”^48 But there is convincing evidence that this partial reprise of Kavkaz began
well before the reversal of the Eg yptian offensive occasioned the Soviet premier’s
concern. Vladimir Agafonov, who was already in Eg ypt with the Scud advisers, noted
the arrival “at the beginning of hostilities ... for defense of Cairo, [of ] an air defense
SAM battalion at full combat complement under Col. Bryantsev.”^49
This narrows down the time frame of a testimony from Valentin Sapizhenko,
whereby “in October 1973” a battalion was assembled from units of the 8th Air
Defense Army, put under Bryantsev’s command and “sent to take part in hostilities in
the Eg yptian Arab Republic.” He speaks specifically of a SAM-2 divizyon, implying that