The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

“If the Democrats and the US public do not stop laying seige [sic] to their government ... sooner

or later, someone will take a run at us. Friday the PresUS was in good shape domestically.

Now the Soviets see that he is, in their mind, non-functional ... So far the Congress has had

a great time enjoying Détente, wrecking Defense and destroying the President. ... It appears

now that the hawks prevailed over Brezhnev.” ... He [Kissinger] was still puzzled by the

action taken by the Soviets.

CIA Director Colby

noted that the Soviets can recoup with the Arabs if they placed a major force in Cairo. ...

HAK asked “What does 5,000 men in Cairo really mean?” It means that the Soviets want a

challenge and that, if they get in, they’ll never get out. ... If we do put Marines or troops into

the Middle East it will amount to scrapping Détente. ... HAK asked “What did we do

wrong?”^30

Taken separately, each of these cases might be construed as a post facto attempt by
the Soviets to make the best of an undesired predicament. But cumulatively, the facts
as they have now been fleshed out definitely narrow down the spectrum of tenable
hypotheses by ruling out the possibility that an unwitting and unwilling Kremlin
merely tried to cope with a war it had tried to avoid.