The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

this would remain an arena for superpower confrontation, indeed the only area where
bloc alignments were still fluid. Therefore, Soviet policy was built on the assumption
that “as long as hostility dominates in the Middle East, we are needed there.”^7 The
USSR, then, was not merely unable to deliver a settlement with Israel; it had no
perceived interest to do so, and proceeded to hinder the process wherever it could.
The ensuing changes in Soviet attitudes toward Ashraf Marwan exemplify the
gradual turnaround in Moscow–Cairo relations. Despite his last-minute tipoff to
the Israelis or—more plausibly—thanks to its judicious timing and preparation,
Marwan continued to be entrusted with top-level missions for Sadat. Ironically,
this would include escorting Mrs Kissinger and arranging the secretary’s own itin-
erary when he finally did make his first visit to Eg ypt in 1974. Marwan himself was
welcomed in Washington the same year.^8 That November, Marwan’s wife, “Mona
G.A. Nasser,” was along with her mother Tahiya the guest of the prestigious Artek
children’s camp in Crimea.^9
The first Eg yptian–Israeli agreement (the Sinai interim accord) was signed in
September 1975 in Geneva, but it was the product of Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy”
rather than the Soviet-backed Geneva Conference (which never resumed). It gave the
United States alone a monitoring and policing role that for the first time did put US
boots on the ground. As it involved a return of Eg yptian territory, it could be coun-
tenanced by Moscow as embodying some return on its military investment in Eg ypt,
but the trend was unmistakable. In March 1976, Sadat abrogated the friendship and
cooperation treaty five years into its fifteen-year term, and the KGB initiated “active
measures” against him in response.
A letter was forged on French Foreign Ministry paper,

emphasizing that the Eg yptian president’s steps were apparently made with the direct

participation of the United States to open up further prospects for US capital in Middle

Eastern nations and assist in turning Eg ypt into an active conduit for US interests in oil-

producing countries. The document is brought to the attention of Syrian President Assad

through agentura channels.^10

Evidently some of the blame was put on Marwan, as by May 1976, his “anti-Soviet
attitude” had become so irksome for the Soviets that the KGB “implemented a com-
plex operation” to compromise him by revealing his “contacts with US special ser-
vices” and embezzlement of Saudi funds allocated for purchase of US weapons.
Reports were even circulated that he had “intimate relations” with Sadat’s wife, Jehan.
The KGB gave this operation partial credit for Sadat’s subsequent dismissal of
Marwan (but he retained his lucrative position heading the Eg yptian arms indus-
try).^11 Sadat himself was, then, not yet targeted; the Soviet purpose was still to halt
his pro-US tilt, not to remove him.
The breaking point appears to have been Sadat’s celebrated visit to Jerusalem.
According to Oleg Grinevsky, the KGB knew of this dramatic move two days in