The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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NOTES


pp. [58–60]^


uted their identification with the Dakar to a signalman’s wishful thinking. Transcript of
Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee session, [misdated] 6 January 1968, ISA, http://
http://www.archives.gov.il/archives/#/Archive/0b0717068001c167/File/0b07170684cc4835/
Item/0907170684ee6b50


  1. Several Eg yptian claims were listed by Shlomo Abramovich in Yedi’ot Ahronot, 19 April
    1996, p. 20. The most recent—that an “alien” submarine hit the shallow sea bed off
    Alexandria when it made a “hasty” dive after his ship gave chase—was made by an Eg yptian
    naval officer, Mohamed Azab, to al-Sharq al-Awsat in 2005, http://www.aawsat.com/
    details.asp?section=4&issueno=9713&article=309359&feature=#. This was disproved
    when the Dakar’s remains were located elsewhere. An Israeli marine biologist, Asher Gitai,
    has claimed, based on crustaceans that grew on the Dakar’s buoy, that the submarine sank
    in shallow water near the Eg yptian coast and was later moved, which would lend credence
    to the Eg yptian claims with or without Soviet assistance. Gitai, lecture abstract, 21 May
    2002, in authors’ possession; his theory was angrily rejected by the Israeli Navy. Shmu’el
    Me’iri, Zeman Haifa, 24 May 2002, p. 10.

  2. Mike Eldar, Dakar ve-sippurah shel shayyetet ha-tzolelot, Tel Aviv: Nir, 1997, pp. 64–7.

  3. Transcript of cabinet session, 28 January 1968, ISA, http://www.archives.gov.il/archives/#/
    Archive/0b0717068001c167/File/0b07170684cc4835/Item/0907170684ee6b4b

  4. ISA release,10 March 2013, dossier on ISA website, http://www.archives.gov.il

  5. Dayan elaborated: “The Americans said they were taking it upon themselves to contact
    the Russians, but afterward they notified us that they were unsuccessful in this. They asked
    us to find another way to contact the Russians, and we did so.” Transcript of Defense and
    Foreign Affairs Committee session, [misdated] 6 January 1968. If the Americans gave this
    weak excuse, it conforms with their reluctance to get involved, as described by Erell.

  6. Vinogradov’s return was announced only on 21 April, after Gromyko’s Eg yptian counter-
    part Riad had been received in Moscow (which was announced at the time). Reuters and
    UPI, Davar, 22 April 1968, p. 1.

  7. Reuters, Cairo, quoted in Davar, 3 April 1968, p. 1.

  8. An Israeli intelligence officer noted in the margin of Malashenko’s book, next to Kirichenko’s
    name, “PGU?” (the KGB First Directorate). Grechko also had a sister, Pavla, who was
    married to a division-level artillery adviser, Nikolay Gontarev, and apparently accompa-
    nied him in Eg ypt.

  9. Zub, “Sovetskie moryaki: Voiny-internatsionalisty v OAR-Egipet,” pp. 78–9.

  10. Foxbats, pp. 131–2; for the establishment of an advanced Soviet air base in Yemen, see
    Jesse Ferris, “Soviet Support for Eg ypt’s Intervention in Yemen, 1962–1963,” Journal of
    Cold War Studies, 10, 4 (2008), p. 28. http://acepilots.com/vietnam/olds_bolo.html

  11. Reports from Paris by Uri Dann, Ma’ariv, 3 April 1968, p. 4 and 14 April, p. 2; Soviet
    press reports quoted in Dishon et al., Middle East Record 1968, p. 35.

  12. L. Zakharov, “Komandirovka v Egipet,” Mir Aviatsii journal, 5 (2005), pp. 24–39.

  13. National Intelligence Estimate 11–06–67, “Soviet Strateg y and Intentions in the
    Mediterranean Basin,” 16 May 1968, p. 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/
    docs/DOC_0000278476.pdf. In October 1968, Allon referred in the Knesset to a “squad-

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