NOTES
pp. [65–68]^
- Gorbunov, “Napishi mne.”
- Dev Murarka, “The Ghost of Hollybush,” Spectator, 7 July 1967, p. 4. Israeli Foreign
Ministry official Ilan had earlier suggested—apparently based in part on Murarka’s 7 July
report, as quoted by Galili—that East European volunteers would begin “organization,
planning and direct assistance for a war of harassment” (milhemet hatradah, as distinct
from milhemet hatashah—the harsher term that would become standard for “war of attri-
tion”). Ilan to Teko’a, 20 June 1967, ISA HZ-4083/2 - Bar-Siman-Tov, War of Attrition, pp. 145–6, 232n1.
- Foxbats, pp. 18, 34–5, 141, 208.
- Y. Agmon, Foreign Ministry security officer, to director, East Europe Department, 12 June
1968, ISA, HZ-4221/4. - Nikolay Dolgopolov, “Bezvestnost’: Luchshaya nagrada,” Tr u d, 27 September 2001, http://
http://www.trud.ru/article/27–09–2001/30439_bezvestnost—luchshaja_nagrada.html; Ilya
Kuksin, “Legenda Rossiyskoy razvedki,” http://www.berkovich-zametki.com/2009/
Zametki/Nomer15/Kuksin1.php; Foxbats, pp. 43–4. - Morozov, Evreyskaya emigratsiya, pp. 62–3.
- The covert agency known as Lishkat ha-Qesher (Liaison Bureau) and later as Nativ (Trail),
which was aimed at alleviating the plight of Soviet Jews and enabling their immigration
to Israel, took care to distance itself from the CIA and to avoid any activity that could be
construed as espionage. Its “clientele” by definition had little access to privileged political
or military information. Nechemia Levanon, Code Name: “Nativ”, Tel Aviv: Am Oved,
1995, pp. 270, 472 (Levanon headed the agency from 1970). - Golan, Decision Making, pp. 284–5. Other instances in this book describe reports from
the USSR as received indirectly through US intelligence. - THE NUCLEAR NON-ISSUE
- Department of State to embassy in Israel, 28 April 1968, FRUS J-XX, no. 155. Johnson
rejected Rusk’s suggestion that he sign the letter himself. - Telegram from Department of State to embassy in Israel, 6 June 1968, FRUS J-XX, no. 189.
- Telegram from embassy in Israel to Department of State, 2 July 1968, FRUS J-XX, no. 205.
- Foxbats, pp. 49–57.
- Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 186–7,
quoting the estimate’s author Carl Duckett. This is, almost verbatim, the only source that
Primakov (Konfidentsial’no: Blizhniy Vostok na stsene i za kulisami, Moscow: Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, 2006, p. 343) quotes, without attribution, for Israeli possession of nuclear arms in
1968. He does assert that “the USSR knew too” about Israeli nuclear preparations during
the October 1973 war. Primakov does not mention the NPT at all. - In contrast to the Soviet nuclear “umbrella” over Eg ypt (and Syria), this study urged that
“the US should not ... extend ... bilateral guarantees to potential nuclear states ... setting us
against the Soviets.” State Department Policy Planning Council study “After NPT, What?”,
28 May 1968. NSA, Impulse, no. 27. - [Michael] Comay, Israel mission, New York, to Foreign Ministry, 26 November 1968, ISA
HZ-4221/5.