The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

NOTES

pp. [71–75]^

31. The unofficial Soviet triumvirate, which included the heads of the party (Brezhnev), gov-
    ernment (Kosygin) and parliament (Podgorny).


32. Dishon et al., Middle East Record 1968, p. 18.


33. Moshe Zak, Ma’ariv, 5 July 1968, p. 42.


34. Shalom Rosenfeld, Ma’ariv, 5 July 1968, p. 9.


35. AC, Dayan testimony, Part 2, p. 35. A potential attack on the USSR could hardly refer to
    anything but nuclear weapons, presumably missile-launched. The sanitized transcript
    records no comment from the commission members, and none of its released papers men-
    tions the term “nuclear.” Nor does S. Golan’s official 1,350-page survey (Decision Making)
    of the Israeli leadership’s consultations during the 1973 war.


36. Hersh, Samson Option, pp. 139, 174–9. See discussion in Foxbats, p. 33.


37. “YELLOW ARAB HELMET, BLUE RUSSIAN EYES”
    
    
    1. Nitzan Hadas, Israeli embassy Bonn, to Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 15 July 1968, ISA
       HZ-4221/17; Richard Beeston, Sunday Telegraph, translated in Ma’ariv, 3 July 1968, p. 1.
       Reports about “a long shadow” thrown over the talks (London Times), and mutual disap-
       pointment (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, both on 11 July) appear to have rested on the
       phrase “frank views were exchanged” in the final communiqué; Dishon et al., Middle East
       Record 1968, p. 32; Whetten, Canal War, pp. 67–8.
    
    
    2. Gottfried Albrecht, head of Middle East Research Department, and Christel Steffler of
       Soviet Affairs Department, quoted in Hadas, Israel embassy Bonn, to Foreign Ministry,
       15 July 1968, ISA HZ-4221/17; Alfred Vestring, personal assistant to parliamentary sec-
       retary for foreign affairs, Albrecht and Steffler quoted in Hadas to Ministry, 15 July 1968,
       ISA HZ-4221/4.
    
    
    3. Dishon et al., Middle East Record 1968, p. 32.
    
    
    4. Rubinstein, Red Star, pp. 63–4, citing BBC/ME/2830/ p. A9, 25 July 1968.
    
    
    5. Bar-Siman-Tov, War of Attrition, pp. 145–6, 232n1. However, this conclusion is hardly
       supported by the sources cited, such as Yaacov Ro’i (ed.), From Encroachment to Involvement:
       A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945–1973, New York: Wiley,
       1974, p. 514.
    
    
    6. Evgeny Chazov, Zdorov’e i vlast’, Moscow: Novosti, 1992, pp. 41–7.
    
    
    7. Yury Makarenko, who took over in May 1972, interviewed in Meyden, “Na rasstoyanii.”
       His formation sent out patrols to the canal bank to locate and monitor Israeli stations.
       “Under my command were three such groups who together covered the entire length of
       the Suez Canal.” Ivan Skobanev, in “Raketny zaslon: Iz dnevnika starshego leytenanta
       Ivana Skobaneva,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 January 2000, http://www.pvo.su/news/n000114_2.
       htm, apparently refers to such a detachment in describing his “radio-technic” unit num-
       bering some thirty men.
    
    
    8. Nehemia Bergin, who was soon after appointed head of the Russian-language monitor-
       ing unit Masregah, quoted in Adamsky, Kavkaz, p. 136.
    
    
    9. Lt-Col. Anatoly Isaenko, “Nash chelovek v Egipte,” NVO, 21 October 2005.
    
    
    
    


38. Gorbunov, “Napishi mne.”