The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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NOTES


pp. [105–110]^



  1. Interview with Fred Friendly, Ma’ariv, 7 March 1969, p. 10.

  2. Following quotations of Serkov are from Liniya fronta, pp. 52–78.

  3. Bar-Siman-Tov, War of Attrition, p. 46.

  4. IAF website for 3 March 1969, http://www.iaf.org.il/3590-6899-he/IAF.aspx

  5. Shalom (Phantoms, vol. 1 p. 212) quotes an unsourced Israeli claim that several senior
    Soviet advisers were killed in Riad’s party. Western histories also asserted more generally
    that “there were ... some casualties among Soviet military personnel.” Nadav Safran, Israel:
    The Embattled Ally, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1978, pp. 262–3. Cf. Rubinstein, Red Star,
    p. 80. But no Soviet combat fatalities at this stage are mentioned in the veterans’ detailed
    honor rolls.

  6. Moshe Zak, Ma’ariv, 14 March 1969, p. 9. This reading is mirrored in later studies, e.g.,
    “it is not at all certain that the Soviets had any interest in seeing belligerent action ... The
    Soviet political leadership judged that all the diplomatic means available should be tried
    first.” Bar-Siman-Tov, War of Attrition, pp. 46–7.

  7. Israeli accounts confirm that a SAM-2 shot down one of two artillery observation planes
    east of the canal. Avino’am Misnikov, “Happalat Piper 033,” http://www.sky-high.co.il; IAF web-
    site, http://www.iaf.org.il/3590-he/IAF.aspx; Shalom, Phantoms, vol. 1, p. 239.

  8. Jean Daniel, Davar, 22 May 1969, p. 6.

  9. Nasser’s speech to the ASU conference on 27 March; Israeli reports stressed his threat to
    strike at civilian targets within Israel proper. Arab affairs correspondent, Ma’ariv, 28 March
    1969, p. 2.

  10. Uri Dann, Ma’ariv, 8 March 1970, p. 9.

  11. Badry, Ramadan War, p. 17.

  12. This use of the rails was disclosed in Israel by leaking it to the NYT only after the results
    on 8–9 March proved its effectiveness. Hanson W. Baldwin, Tel Aviv, “Sinai Rail Tracks,
    Torn Up, Bolstering Israeli Bunkers,” NYT, 11 March 1969, p. 6; Ma’ariv, 12 March 1969,
    p. 2. There is no evidence that the Eg yptians or Soviets were aware of it earlier—possibly
    because the work was done at night due to Eg yptian sniping.

  13. Shmu’el Segev, Ma’ariv, 24 July 1969, p. 3; on the same page, the paper’s “Arab affairs cor-
    respondent” again discerned “the USSR’s restraining influence.”

  14. Vasiliev, Rossiya, pp. 89, 91–2.

  15. Commander of 336th Infantry battalion, “Report on Experts’ Activity,” 7 November 1969,
    CDE-IHC, 367/12 p. 5. This adviser’s name may have been garbled, as it has not appeared
    in the veterans’ literature.

  16. Upon his return in June 1972 he was rewarded with an appointment as dean of the Western
    Languages Faculty of the Military Languages School (under Katyshkin).

  17. Serkov, Liniya fronta, entry for 18 March 1969, pp. 65–8.

  18. Ibid., entry for 13 March 1969, pp. 63–5. The term “special operations” (spetznaz) may
    indicate that the eponymous Soviet units of this type, which Yaremenko reports as oper-
    ating across the canal during the War of Attrition, were in place by this time and emulated
    by the Eg yptians.

  19. Nasser, according to Heikal, held that “missile cover” was essential for longer raids. Road
    to Ramadan, pp. 53–4.

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