NOTES
pp. [146–148]^
pital after the first. By Goryachkin’s reckoning, Soviet losses in Eg ypt for 1969–70 included
thirty to forty killed, of whom about half were from the “advisers’ apparat” and the rest
from regular Soviet units. Goryachkin, “Sud’ba voennogo perevodchika v Egipte,”
pp. 175–80.- Serkov, Liniya fronta, p. 136.
- Heikal, Road to Ramadan, p. 84.
- Ma’ariv, 30 January 1970, p. 1.
- Arab affairs correspondent, Davar, 30 January 1970, p. 1. Nasser had already met
Vinogradov immediately after the 28 January air raid “to request urgent supply of means
against air attack.” Arab affairs correspondent, Davar, 29 January 1970, p. 1. - NYT Service, “Nasser Soviet Visit Bared,” St. Petersburg Times (FL), 30 January 1970. The
report quotes “diplomats in Cairo” that Nasser went primarily to request Soviet support
in recapturing Shadwan Island in the Red Sea, which Israeli paratroops had raided the
same day (22 January) and evacuated only while he was in Moscow; the air defense issue
is listed among “other topics.” This version was unlikely even at the time, given the sequence
of events as well as the island’s minor importance, and Heikal’s account does not mention
Shadwan at all—although he commented on it in Al-Ahram on 23 January, which casts
further doubt whether he was then in Moscow with Nasser. But the theory that the visit
was triggered by Shadwan rather than the depth bombings is still proposed (e.g., by Israeli
military historian Avraham Zohar, “Ha’im levatze’a haftzatzot omeq be-milhemet ha-
hatashah,” in Yehudit Reifen-Ronen and Avraham Zohar (eds), Yahasei medinah-tzava
be-Yisrael 1948–1974, Tel Aviv: Golda Meir Memorial Fund and Tel Aviv University,
2004, http://goldameir.org.il/archive/home/he/1/1133282899.html#a003 - Department of State telegram 034236 from secretary of state to American embassy, Tel
Aviv, 1 February 1970. NARA, NSC country files, ME–Israel, box 605. - Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer, The Yom Kippur War: Moment of Truth, updated edn,
Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Ahronot-Hemed, 2004, pp. 174–88. - Eliyahu Ze’ira, Myth versus Reality: The October 1973 War; Failures and Lessons, Tel Aviv:
Miskal, 2004, pp. 112, 116, 145–63. Maj.-Gen. Shlomo Gazit, who succeeded Ze’ira as
MI chief, conceded after Marwan’s death that there were indications he was a double agent,
but also alternative interpretations. Gazit, “Mot ha-Sokhen,” NRG website, 4 July 2007,
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/603/909.html. The latest publication supporting
Ze’ira’s position is former MI officer Shimon Mendes’s Sadat’s Jihad, Tel Aviv: Effi, 2015,
which portrays Marwan as part of an elaborate Eg yptian deception effort. - “A-G Closes Investigation into Former MI Chief Ze’ira,” Jerusalem Post, 9 July 2012,
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=276764 - Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, “Israel’s Best Spy—Or a Master Double Agent? New
Light from the Soviet Angle on the Mystery of Ashraf Marwan,” in Need to Know V:
The Human Element, Funen, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark Press,
forthcoming. - Dudchenko, Kanal, Part 1, Chapter 2.
- Uri Bar-Joseph, The Angel: Ashraf Marwan, the Mossad and the Yom Kippur War, Tel Aviv: