The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

NOTES

pp. [150–154]^

reportedly admitted, after the 1973 war, that he had initiated the bombings, for which

“the Americans were very supportive,” and “the bombings obliged Nasser to enlist direct

Soviet intervention.” Tzvi Y. Kesseh, letter to Ha’aretz, 27 January 2002, p. B2. Rabin is

said to have made a special home visit to convey US support for the raids as a means of

toppling Nasser, whereas both Dayan and Eban reportedly opposed the bombings for fear

of Soviet response but were outvoted. Maj.-Gen. Emanuel Sakal, “The Regulars Will Hold!”

The Missed Opportunity to Prevail in the Defensive Campaign in the Yom Kippur War, Tel

Aviv: Ma’ariv, 2011, p. 48.

88. Eric Downton, Daily Telegraph from Beirut, Ma’ariv, 4 January 1970, p. 4.


89. Yosef Harif, Ma’ariv, 6 February 1970, pp. 11, 22. Eban’s talk with the ambassador is dated
    “a few days ago.” Another Ma’ariv commentator, Shmu’el Segev, who was connected more
    with intelligence sources than political ones like Harif ’s, had suggested a more realistic
    reading : that the Soviets would concentrate on improving Eg ypt’s air defense, including
    SAM-3s; 5 February 1970, p. 9.


90. OPERATION KAVKAZ IS FORMALLY ORGANIZED
    
    
    1. Safran, Embattled Ally, pp. 264–5. Apparently, the ultimate source is Heikal’s Road to
       Ramadan.
    
    
    2. Yaremenko’s version is supported by the memoir of former British Foreign Secretary George
       Brown (In My Way, London: Penguin, 1972, pp. 223–4). He met Nasser on 5 January—
       that is, before the first “depth bombing”—and found him “over-involved with the Russians.”
       The Eg yptian president told Brown that he had twice responded in kind when “Khrushchev
       attacked me in public,” but “if Mr. Kosygin were to attack me now, I would not say a word.”
       On the road to the canal zone the same day, Brown encountered “large SAM trailers,” but
       his escort’s notes do not specify of which model. Bronwen Maddox, “George of Arabia,”
       Prospect (London), April 2013, p. 48.
    
    
    3. Yaremenko, “Sovetsko-egipetskoe voennoe sotrudnichestvo,” pp. 45–6; Telephone inter-
       view with Yaremenko, 25 October 2000. Zolotarev (Rossiya, p. 189) states that Nasser
       several times offered to adhere to the Warsaw Pact “even tomorrow,” quoting an article by
       I. Morozov, “Egipet, 1970 god: Skhvatka bez rukopashnoy,” Vecherny Klub, 13 August
       1994.
    
    
    4. Telephone interview with Karen Brutents (Moscow), 17 October 2000.
    
    
    5. Telephone interview with Dobrynin (Moscow), 10 October 2000.
    
    
    6. Rubinstein, Red Star, p. 149.
    
    
    7. Yaremenko, “Sovetsko-egipetskoe voennoe sotrudnichestvo,” pp. 44–5.
    
    
    8. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 561.
    
    
    9. Korn, Stalemate, pp. 193, 301n22.
    
    
    
    


91. SAR, no. 47, pp. 121–2.


92. SAR, no. 48, pp. 123–5.


93. Abramov, Goluboe, pp. 50–6.


94. Pochtarev, “Kak podrezali kryl’ya fantomam.”


95. Smirnov, “O podgotovke,” p. 22.