NOTES
pp. [259–261]^
and “Siriyskaya komandirovka,” Ekspress Novosti (Minsk), 39, 26 September 2003, http://
expressnovosti.narod.ru/39/za.htm
- Vadim Udmantsev, “Bezvizovaya komandirovka,” Voyenno-promyshlenny Kur’er, 23
(11 June 2008), http://vpk-news.ru/articles/5175. The account is based on documents
and oral accounts provided by Nikiforov, then the director of the Almaz design bureau’s
museum. His allusion to faulty missiles may refer to their assembly under license at an
Eg ypian plant, which is otherwise documented only later. - SAR, no. 300, pp. 673–5.
- SAR, no. 301, pp. 675, 679.
- Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1151.
- SAR, no. 308, pp. 745–6.
- Even to mid-ranking Soviet officials. On 25 April, Chernyaev wrote: “it was announced
that Kissinger was in Moscow from April 20–24th, and Brezhnev and Gromyko received
h i m .” Diary, 1972, p. 14. - Ahron Bregman and Jihan El-Tahri, The Fifty Years War, London: Penguin and BBC,
1998, p. 111. - Mubarak’s appointment was described as “hasty” to enable his inclusion in the party. News
agencies, Davar, 28 April 1972, p. 1. He was “the first EAF commander who can be
described without reservation as Soviet-trained, a fact that undoubtedly contributed to
his promotion.” Arab affairs correspondent, Davar, 25 April 1972, p. 2. - Laqueur, Confrontation, p. 15.
- General Ahmed Fakher, a member of the military delegation that accompanied Sadat to
Moscow, quoted in Bregman and El-Tahri, Fifty Years War, p. 111. - SAR, no. 346, p. 831. This refers to Brezhnev’s “military policies” in general, but in view
of Grechko’s previous opposition to the withdrawal, he would hardly have been “used” if
his position had not changed. - Kimche, Last Option, p. 22. Kimche was a senior Mossad official at the time; together
with Whetten’s aforementioned reference, this may indicate that some of the agency’s
informants—evidently not Marwan—reported preparation for an agreed Soviet with-
drawal, but were discounted or ignored. - Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré and Mose L. Har ve y, The Soviet Union and the October 1973
Middle East War: The Implications for Détente, Coral Gables: University of Miami, 1974,
pp. 33–4, quoting Pravda, 30 April 1972. - War Ministry, “Instructions of the General Command of the Armed Forces,” 8 May 1972,
CDE-IHC. - Heikal, Road to Ramadan, pp. 156–65; Heikal, Sphinx, p. 238.
- Egorin, Egipet, p. 202. This anecdote is dated after May 1971; Egorin left Eg ypt later that
year. - The missiles demonstrated were the Ametist (Starbright), an improved submarine-launched
version of the Styx, and the P-35 (Sepal) cruise missile. Capt. Yury Kruchinin, Komanduyu
korablem, Sevastopol: L. Yu. Kruchinin, 2008, http://www.proza.ru/2010/02/27/1219.
He commanded a BPK, Krasny Kavkaz, that accompanied the Grozny from Sevastopol