NOTES
pp. [312–315]^
pp. 102–3, 106. The book claims to reproduce a thesis on Arab–Israeli wars to 1982, writ-
ten for a Soviet military academy by an unnamed Syrian officer “who in September 1970
served as head of intelligence in the southern military district” (p. 141). It includes testi-
monies by other “Arab officers and generals who studied at Soviet military academies ...
They were required to provide detailed descriptions of their combat experience” (p. 4).- Pernavsky, Arabo-izrail’skie voyny, pp. 104–6. The “elaboration” went on from 22 February
to 7 March. - US embassy, Rabat to State Department, 20 March 1973, https://www.wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/1973RABAT01213_b.html - Bar-Joseph, Angel, pp. 192–4, unsourced (there may of course have been two such con-
ferences). Kissinger shortly afterward claimed to Brezhnev, “we have information that at
the Arab Chiefs of Staff meeting, April 21–25, there was an atmosphere of despair and
foreboding because of the Eg yptian determination to go to war.” Memorandum of con-
versation, Zavidovo, 7 May 1973, FRUS N-XV, no. 109. - Editorial note, FRUS N-XXV, no. 38.
- Eban recalled only one US “exceptional figure” who insisted that “you’re all being deluded
... including our president, our government, our secretary of state. ... The Russians want
not only ‘controlled obtension’—I think I [Eban] coined that phrase—[but] war too.” In
the testimony, as declassified in autumn 2013, this US figure’s identity was still sanitized,
probably indicating an intelligence official. AC, Eban testimony, Part 2, p. 25. The offi-
cial CIA position, as quoted by Kissinger to Nixon in mid-May, was that “substantial
Eg yptian–Israel hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks ... Arab–Israeli hostili-
ties taking place in 1973 would not involve wide-ranging ground warfare on the Eg yptian
front.” National Intelligence Estimate, 17 May 1973, FRUS N-XXV, no. 59. - Zurhellen to State Department, 21 March 1973, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1973TELAV02177_b.html - Primakov, Blizhniy Vostok, p. 281. Kotov is identified in the Mitrokhin Archive as a “legal”
agent in the Soviet embassy, Tel Aviv, before the 1967 war. Ronen Bergman, “Secret
Documents Expose Israeli Politicians, Senior Defense Officials as KGB spies,” ynet news
(English), 26 October 2016, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4870386,00.
html - Baron was now ambassador to the Netherlands. Primakov, Blizhniy Vostok, pp. 281–4.
- Amnon Lord, The Lost Generation: The Story of the Yom Kippur War, Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot
Ahronot, 2013, pp. 59–61. He claims that the Primakov “channel” was managed by Efraim
Halevy, a senior operative (and later head) of the Mossad—the KGB’s counterpart agency. - “WE WILL BE TWO ISMAILS”
- AP, “Sadat Juggles His Cabinet,” Gazette (Schenectady, NY), 28 March 1973, p. 7.
- AP, “Sadat Issues Call for War with Israel,” News (Tonawanda, NY), 24 March 1973, p. 4-B
- Henry Tanner, “Sadat Broadens His Emergency Powers,” NYT, 30 March 1973, p. 4.
- “Sadat Appoints a New Cabinet,” NYT, 28 March 1973, p. 5.
- “Smirnov,” Arabo-izrail’skie voyny, p. 307.