NOTES
pp. [333–336]^
gence, does not dispute this estimate but notes that Sadat underestimated the time Israel
needed to detect his preparations. Sakal (Regulars, p. 82) quotes a range of Israeli esti-
mates of necessary prior alert between “reasonable” (a week) and “absolutely minimal”
(forty-eight hours).- Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, p. 5.
- “In late September,” the Soviets flew six Tu-22s to Iraq (out of a total transfer of twenty-
four). Turkey, which had denied overflight permission in June 1967, granted it this time—
or the Soviets ignored its refusal. AC, Eban testimony, Part 1, pp. 5, 12. On 10 October,
the Americans were still unsure about this: “apparent Soviet violations of the Greek and
maybe Turkish air control zones will sooner or later become general knowledge, if that is
what actually is happening.” Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “The Soviet Role,” 10 October
1973, FRUS N-XXV, no. 142. - Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises, New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2003, p. 21. - Foxbats, pp. 88–95.
- AC, Eban testimony, Part 1, pp. 2–5, 12, 20–1, 23; a sanitized passage refers to one of
divergent US estimates at the time. - AC, Eini testimony, pp. 20–3. Eini added that if Marwan were not genuinely serving Israel
he would never “have left his country” to relay his message. But Bar-Joseph states that
Marwan did not come to London specially from Eg ypt; rather, he continued alone from
a preplanned delegation to Paris. - Bergman and Meltzer, Yom Kippur War, pp. 36–7.
- AC, Eban testimony, Part 1, pp. 49–50; APR, pp. 58, 59n.
- Bregman calculates Marwan’s total payments from the Israelis as over $1 million. “Ashraf
Marwan and Israel’s Intelligence Failure,” in Siniver, October 1973 War, p. 301n8. - As Zamir’s message was first passed orally to Eini, there are conflicting versions as to its
exact content and when it was transmitted to the top leadership; Golan, Decision Making,
pp. 249–50. This controversy has deflected attention from the element of Soviet non-par-
ticipation, which is common to all the versions. Bergman and Meltzer, Yom Kippur War,
pp. 40–1; Bar-Joseph, Angel, pp. 231–5. - Transcript of [ministerial] “consultation at the Prime Minister’s,” 6 October 1973 at 08:05,
released by ISA 2012, http://my.ynet.co.il/pic/news/yk%206%2010%2008%2005%20.
pdf, p. 2; AC, APR, pp. 44–5. - Kissinger, Crisis, p. 14.
- AC, Eban testimony, Part 1, pp. 51–3.
- This account is summarized from Kissinger’s version in Crisis, pp. 16–18, 28, 34–7; tran-
script of his talk with Dobrynin also in FRUS N-XXV, no. 100. - According to Kissinger, Brezhnev also claimed (as is now clear, just as falsely), that the
Soviet navy had been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean. Transcripts of conver-
sations with Senator Mike Mansfield and President Nixon, 7 October 1973, in Kissinger,
Crisis, pp. 108–9. FRUS N-XXV reproduces the latter transcript (no. 122) and a message
from Brezhnev that was delivered shortly before (no. 120)—which does not mention the