THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973to prepare reports ... and then they would wait for the attaché’s return. Often, Vi would
come back flushed and irritated, lock himself in his office and let no one in (“plugged
himself into the lightning rod,” they would say of him in these moments). Then, close to
0700, Vi would conduct an analysis of what had taken place and assign new tasks.Fursov had cause for concern; when toward the end of 1967 the first round of deco-
rations was proclaimed for service in Eg ypt, “the list included neither V.I. Fursov nor
several others who really had devoted part of their lives to those events in June”—
another allusion to the Soviet role in precipitating the crisis. “Fursov did get promoted
to major-general ... but his mission in Eg ypt was nearly over. Many were replaced.”^33
Lashchenko replaced Fursov as chief adviser; this post would henceforth be sepa-
rate from the military attaché, and feuding between them would ensue. A hands-on
commander in the marshal’s own mold, Lashchenko recalled twenty years later “we
lost no time: we not only engaged in talks but helped the Eg yptians restore order in
their devastated military establishment, and our practical efforts ... were more effec-
tive than mere words in agitating for formalization of the advisers’ apparat.”^34 This
would be no fast or easy task, but Lashchenko accomplished it with distinction that
would leave a lasting mark. The total absence of his momentous input and even his
name from Western intelligence reports and subsequent historiography alike is a
striking testimony to their deficiency for lack of Soviet sources.
Unlike the anti-aircraft crews’ deployment, the introduction of Soviet combat
units into the actual war zone was flaunted as a response to resumed Israeli “aggres-
sion.” The same rationale had been prepared for the intervention that was planned a
few weeks earlier for the same Soviet forces—warships and marines. To assess whether
their high-profile entry into Port Said on 9 July 1967 was likewise premeditated, the
timeline of events has to be closely scrutinized.
Post-Soviet Russian accounts state that the Soviet Mediterranean Eskadra (squad-
ron) had units, including a command post on the missile cruiser Dzerzhinsky, “based”
in Port Said from 1 to 30 or “31” June. The specific ships so listed correspond with
some of those whose “arrival” was trumpeted on 9 July—particularly two large land-
ing vessels (BDK, bol’shoy desantny korabl’, the Soviet equivalent of an LST—landing
ship, tank), Voronezhsky Komsomolets and Krymsky Komsomolets, and two medium-
sized ones (sredny desantny korabl’, SDK), numbers 34 and 64, with a marine detach-
ment. This formation, the 309th OMBP (independent marine battalion), had been
assembled in 1966 from elements of the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern Fleets, as well
as amphibious tanks and mobile artillery from ground forces in southern Russia.^35
Israeli records appear to contradict this claim of consecutive Soviet presence: on
the night of 5 June, IDF naval commandos penetrated Port Said but could not locate
any targets as the harbor was empty. This, of course, means that no Eg yptian ships
were found either, and these were definitely present before the outbreak of war. They
evidently put to sea after Israel’s initial air strike in order not to present an immobile