THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973completion in Kaliningrad in 1966 and is also listed as “based in Eg yptian ports from
June 1967.”^40 Shevchenko’s engagement appears to be reflected in the latter ship’s
combat record: “its name was glorified in Port Said during the Arab–Israeli conflict:
the ship gave internationalist support to the armed forces of Eg ypt ... in repulsing
Israeli aggression.”^41 Mallin’s detachment, it thus appears, had to be sent urgently in
relief, and since no BDK was available it had to sail in a destroyer.^42
D. The Soviet Navy moves in (again?)
It appears, then, that at least the greater part of the Soviet flotilla whose entry into
Port Said (and Alexandria) was announced with great fanfare on 9 July was already
there, and involved in combat operations, a month earlier. How could this have gone
unnoticed, which permitted the second “visit” to be billed as unprecedented? One
explanation is that the US consulates in both Eg yptian ports were sacked by mobs
and evacuated on 6 June. But even if the Americans had an inkling of the Soviet
Navy’s move, they preferred to play it down—as they would when it became a per-
manent deployment. The ships may have left port and returned, or even stayed and
just had their “arrival” announced belatedly. Even then, all reports were from
Alexandria; none bore a Port Said dateline, so there was no verification of exactly
when the Soviet ships first anchored there.
Why bother with such an exercise? As with their planned intervention in what
became the Six-Day War, the Soviets put a premium on the legitimacy of defending
“victims of aggression.” But they also preferred that their move look like a successful
initiative to rehabilitate Eg ypt’s sovereignty and strength, rather than a costly and
doomed rear-guard action as Shevchenko’s became.
According to an Eg yptian admiral quoted by Kimche, as early as 18 June a delega-
tion of his Soviet counterparts presented to Nasser a detailed, “ready-made schedule”
for Soviet use of Eg yptian ports. This account puts the naval delegation’s arrival three
days ahead of “the Podgorny–Zakharov mission,” and “it was no accident that the
admirals came first ... for in Soviet eyes it was the Mediterranean and the domination
of the US Sixth Fleet that were of prime concern.” But as it was since established that
Zakharov came on 16 June and separately from Podgorny, it rather appears that the
naval officers were part of the marshal’s large group. Their program indeed stressed
Soviet-controlled facilities for air and sea surveillance of the Mediterranean. One of
their key demands was for monthly eight-day visits by the squadron’s ships.^43 For this,
and for the formalization of the Soviet naval presence, they were handed—or helped
to create—the opportunity of the battles around Ras el-Ish.
While the 8 June Eg yptian–Israeli ceasefire line was clearly defined along the Suez
Canal from Qantara south to Suez City, the northernmost sector remained an
unstable flashpoint. The marshes east of the canal had obstructed an Israeli advance
to, and permanent stationing on, the canal bank. Port Fuad, east of the canal’s north-
ern end opposite Port Said, remained the only Eg yptian foothold on its eastern side.