HOLDING THE LINE ON THE SUEZ CANALthey want to conquer it, to move military operations west of the Suez Canal ... to abolish
the regime. At this difficult moment I turn to the Central Committee and Soviet govern-
ment to undertake urgent measures in defense of ... the UAR, the urgent expedition of
planes together with pilots ... to take over not only the anti-aircraft command but also the
Eg yptian air forces while they are still not destroyed ... we are ready to make available to
you all airports.” Very fast, at 3:00 a.m., we convened the Politburo. We called our embassy
in Cairo ... but there were no grounds to send out our troops ... However, taking into
account the moral-political factor, we decided to render support to Nasser and we gave
orders to our military navy and submarines to call at the Arab ports under the pretext of a
friendship visit. ... The next day, on July 9, Nasser said to our ambassador that he had
already given orders to his air force to attack and destroy the Israeli armored units and only
bad weather, clouds, had prevented it.^58Was this a pre-planned gambit? Even if Soviet complicity in initiating the Ras el-
Ish clash cannot yet be conclusively demonstrated, there can be little doubt that it was
quickly and effectively followed up on to legitimize a major Soviet objective: an overt
and permanent naval presence in Eg yptian ports. Besides the strategic significance of
this goal, it offered an immediate political benefit. The mutual complaints lodged at
the United Nations by Eg ypt and Israel spurred negotiations for the posting of UN
observers to monitor the ceasefire. If the Soviet force intervened first to deter an
Israeli advance and determine the ceasefire line, this would go a long way toward
redeeming the USSR’s reputation in the Arab world.
Cairo’s first communiqué about the 8 July battle was issued within half an hour of
the first shelling, and when the Israeli air strike began the Eg yptian and Soviet dele-
gates at the UN had already discussed and implemented the diplomatic response.
Israel reported that the shore batteries at Port Said, normally mounted facing north
at the Mediterranean, were swung around by 180 degrees to pound the IDF force, a
maneuver that required some time and preparation in addition to technical exper-
tise.^59 A Soviet adviser who later emigrated to Israel related in a debriefing that he had
witnessed these batteries firing at Israeli craft during the failed raid on Port Said
harbor on 5 June; he thus was certainly present when these guns were activated a
month later.^60
E. The Fifth Eskadra is formally created—while in action
The Soviet Mediterranean flotilla had been greatly reinforced in the lead-up to the
Six-Day War, in which it was slated to take an active part. But it was still formally
designated as a makeshift “combined eskadra” of ships from the Black Sea, Baltic and
Northern fleets. We have demonstrated that its incorporation as a permanent eskadra
was delayed in order to downplay its preparation for a central role in the Soviet inter-
vention plan. The magnitude of this mission is highlighted by the arrival, on 11 May,
of the Black Sea Fleet’s deputy commander, Vice-Admiral Viktor Sysoev, to take