The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

now Eg ypt’s great hope. After being saluted, they would be fitted with [Eg yptian] yellow

helmets.^83

The Soviet news agency TASS, too, trumpeted the “friendly” visit, stressing Riad’s
“warm welcome.” Krasnaya Zvezda published a feature that the son of one of the
Tu-16 co-pilots recently described as “written in the best Brezhnev tradition: the
facts were accurate but it leaves a feeling of something unsaid.” His father, then-Lt.
Boris Mel’nik, helped him fill in the blanks: “the main mission was to demonstrate
the capabilities of [our] aviation hardware ... [but] the flights in Eg ypt did not always
go smoothly.” One demonstration was carpet bombing by all ten planes in the desert
near Cairo. Hulks of vehicles destroyed by the Israelis in the June air raids were used
to mark the target areas, but the pilots had trouble identifying them. “The bombs
were dropped [only] 2km from the UAR leaders’ observation point, and the shock-
waves from 54 250-kg bombs knocked them off their feet. Fortunately there were no
casualties.”^84 The mishap was not publicized, and it did not prevent EAF chief
Shalaby el-Hinnawy from seeing off the guests on 8 December.
Within a few days of the bombers’ welcoming ceremony so close to Cairo’s inter-
national airport, alarmed “diplomatic reports” in the Western press reflected the
innovation. “The Soviet Union is escalating its aid to Eg ypt in return for wider con-
trols and base facilities.” The latter (along with Eg yptian cotton) were described as
part payment for Soviet supplies of arms, food and an oil refinery to replace the
facility just destroyed at Suez City:

Moscow now is pushing all out for the penetration of Eg ypt ... Eg ypt has denied that she

is granting “bases” to anyone. But no matter how these facilities are labeled, they amount

to the same. ... The Soviet Union was said to have reserved the right to control the use of

the new equipment. The Soviets retain a finger on the trigger, presumably to avert the

danger of being involved against their will in any confrontation with the United States.^85

By January 1968, IAF Commander Hod stated to USAF officers “in a free-wheel-
ing ... candid and cordial manner” that “Russian pilots are flying, and working with
Russian controllers.”^86 This assessment not only contradicted public statements but
was not endorsed by most levels of Israeli officialdom. Nitzan Hadas, the Israeli dip-
lomat in Bonn who had been relaying the Germans’ moderately pessimistic estimates
about potential Soviet bases, was admonished by his regional desk officer in Jerusalem:
“Nasser will not be enthusiastic to change his status as a nonaligned statesman, and
will see no advantage to be in the Soviets’ pocket ... the Soviets’ achievements ... are
being overestimated in the West.”
The Israeli official emphasized that “declared Soviet policy is against bases in for-
eign countries. So far we have not heard of any change.”^87 Soviet theoreticians, how-
ever, singled out the Middle East and Eg ypt in particular as an exception:

obtaining bases on foreign soil—no matter how they are called, no matter under which

flag—was fundamentally opposed to Soviet policy principles in the region ... [because] the