The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

After learning about Grechko’s order not to be taken prisoner, Elena suspects this
was intentional.

I remember how our neighbor, an artillery man ... mentioned in passing that they had seen

a plane of ours burning in the sky. Mama said right away “oy, that is Sasha.” ... I remember

how we were sent back with the coffin in the top commander’s plane, the farewell at the

officers’ club.^39

Unexplained accidents would also plague the Soviet airmen after regular squad-
rons were posted to Eg ypt: in the summer of 1971, a two-seat MiG-21U trainer
crashed into Lake Qarun “five seconds after reporting they were on their way back”
to nearby Qawm Ushim airbase.^40

E. ... and endorses planning for a cross-canal offensive

During his tour in March 1968, Grechko was as usual reported to have counselled at all
three Arab capitals not to undertake any offensive against Israel—for the time being.
One reason “foreign diplomats in Paris” suggested for this was that “the problems now
preoccupying the USSR in Czechoslovakia and Poland, which also have a military
aspect, reduce the Soviets’ ability to intervene forcefully ... in case of a Middle East
conflict”—a linkage that would be partly borne out within a few months.
However, Malashenko holds that the minister’s advice to delay any offensive ambi-
tions stemmed primarily from his dissatisfaction at the state of Eg yptian troops.
Inspecting defenses on the canal bank on his way to Port Said, the marshal commented
that it “should be easier to cross than the Dnieper was during [Soviet army] exercises the
previous autumn”—but the Eg yptians were clearly not up to it. “As usual, in some of
the trenches soldiers were preparing their own food. Grechko inquired about their
rations, which consisted of pita bread and onions.” Visiting a brigade on the “third line”
of defense west of Ismailia, he asked for a demonstration of a counterattack against an
Israeli breakthrough. Malashenko witnessed how “after some delay, three tanks moved
forward, followed by several infantry detachments of 20–30 men. The marshal said that
such action should follow the order much more promptly.”
Still, in order to address this weakness, Grechko endorsed Lashchenko’s project to
pull back front-line formations for intensive training, which was already being imple-
mented. Karpov’s 118th Infantry Brigade had been withdrawn to Qassassin, west of
Ismailia on the Sweet Water Canal from the Nile, to drill an attack across a water
obstacle. When Grechko himself recognized him, Karpov could remind the marshal
that they had met before “while training on the Danube in Hungary. ... The army
corps chief of staff attended [the exercise].” Later, the division chief of staff ’s adviser,
Afanas’ev, returned from a council of senior advisers with the Soviet defense minister
in Cairo and reported to his colleagues: “Grechko confirmed that if the attack should
begin, we must be with the Eg yptians and help them.” To Karpov, this seemed easier