THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973This presaged what would become the stock Soviet line whereby Moscow pre-
ferred a political solution, but if it was not forthcoming would reluctantly support a
war of attrition.^43
The War of Attrition is usually dated as beginning on 9 March 1969. However,
several earlier dates have been proposed—some of them by parties closely involved,
such as then-Vice President Anwar Sadat. This suggests a phased development coor-
dinated with Moscow and with its advisers on the ground over the summer of 1968.
By the anniversary of the Six-Day War on 5 June, Malashenko’s general estimate of
the Soviet resupply effort as well as the advisers’ work was that the Eg yptian Army
had been restored to combat form—quantitatively. Still,
analysis of incidents indicates that despite the Eg yptians’ superiority, they cannot inflict
significant casualties, and permit [Israeli] fire at cities and forces with impunity. Eg yptian
artillery takes too long to fire, and [hits] open areas rather than targets identified by intel-
ligence. Division and brigade commanders do not direct the fire, and cannot see the targets
beyond the rampart [on the Israeli-held bank]. The Israelis shoot more efficiently, make
better use of mobile weapons, and change positions frequently.Nonetheless, or indeed because of these Eg yptian military shortcomings, Bar-
Siman-Tov’s perceptive study concluded as early as 1980 that “the Soviet leadership
framed its decision for [military] intervention as a matter of principle even before the
War of Attrition” and “the Kremlin gave Nasser this understanding” when he visited
Moscow in July 1968.^44 To set the scene for this development, two digressions are
now in order.
First, the “intelligence on Israeli targets” that Malashenko mentioned (and about
Israel in general) was no longer as easy to come by as it had been a year before. The
diplomatic rupture with Israel in June 1967 faced the Soviets with urgent damage con-
trol, as the “legal” rezidenturas in the embassies of the USSR and its satellites were
obliterated at a stroke, which disrupted communication with their “illegals” as well.
Some stopgap was provided by the “Red” Russian Orthodox Church mission; a series
of incidents before the June war had already shown up much of its personnel as KGB
operatives.^45 Within a year, Israel’s security services warned: “the mission is increasingly
becoming a substitute for the diplomatic representation at least in regard of observation
assignments, and is using both overt and clandestine means for this purpose.”^46
The urgent need to augment this capability demanded posting new undercover
agents, and this was begun forthwith by short-term missions of such senior operatives
as Mikhail and Elizaveta Mukasei.^47 However, rebuilding a full and permanent “ille-
gal” infrastructure required some compromises with the increasingly harsh domestic
repercussions of the clash with Israel. In June 1968, exactly one year after the Central
Committee approved their own recommendation to halt emigration to Israel,
Andropov and Gromyko requested and secured a resolution to “resume the emigra-
tion ... in a number limited to 1,500 persons this year.” While one rationale given for