PRO]EcrS FOR REFORMING THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION 283these officials acted as the direct personal representatives of the
monarch. At the same time, these wide powers were not clearly defined;
and since the time of Paul I, at least, the governor was not even subject
to the control and supervision of the central colleges (or ministries
after 1802) and the Senate. In principle, the governor carried out the
orders of the ministers, but in practice he was not responsible to the
minister, whom he could by-pass by addressing himself to the Emperor
directly. The Statute on the Provinces of 1775 had adjoined to the
governor a Council whose members were directly subordinate to the
Senate. Some matters had always to be submitted for the Council's
advice before action could be taken. The Council was seen as a con-
sultative college to the governor and a brake on his personal despotism.
In practice, however, the Council's power and influence were negligible.
In the first place, the prestige of a governor as the personal representa-
tive of the Autocrat exercised an overwhelming fascination on the
Council. And with the decline of the political and administrative role
of the Senate under Alexander I, the position of the governor grew
stronger still. Secondly, by virtue of the Law of 1775, the councillors
could not prevent the execution of the governor's decision; they merely
registered their dissent and reported it to the Senate. This was a
"right", Speransky noted, which was held by even the lowliest of
government clerks to protect him from the consequences of his
superior's illegal actions.^1 Furthermore, there was no effective appeal
from the governor's decisions. Appeal from a decision, whose execution
could not be stayed anyway without the governor's consent, involved a
very long and cumbersome procedure. The outcome of an appeal was
always very much in doubt, and its procedural complexities ruled it
out for the class that needed it most, i.e. the peasantry. To add to the
governor's actual power, the entire bureaucratic apparatus of the
provincial administration was in his hands. He could hire and fire
most of his subordinates, and often he came wit..lt his personal chancery
(Speransky himself had done so as Governor-General of Siberia). In
short, the most serious defect of the local administration was the
governor's extensive power; power that was alJ:nost without limit or
control. As Speransky phrased it, "an inadequacy of legal power under
conditions of excessive personal arbitrariness." 2
The wide powers of the governor might have been a blessing in
disguise, had they been conducive to an orderly and speedy flow of
1 Speranskii, "Zamechaniia 0 gubernskikh uchrezhdeniiakh" Arkhiv istoricheskikh
i praktioheskikh svedenii, (1859), No.4, pp. 95-96.
2 Ibid., p. 97.