ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES 1802-1812 77the Emperor who also wished to keep up the contact he had established
with Talleyrand at Erfurt. Under the pretext of negotiating a financial
agreement, Alexander sent to Paris the young Count Nesselrode, future
Foreign Minister of Nicholas I. In order to avoid raising any suspicion!>
and to leave in the dark the vice-chancellor Count Rumiantsev, whose
francophilia was needed to keep up the pretense of cordial relations
with France, Nesselrode was instructed to report in cypher directly to
Speransky who in turn transmitted the reports to the Emperor in
person.
This arrangement gave Speransky occasion to present his own views
on Russia's diplomacy. Two of his papers on this subject have been
preserved and published. His views, it is true, were not very original
or interesting and do not seem to have played an important role in
shaping Alexander's policy towards France. Even though Speransky
recommended a course close to the one followed by the Emperor, it is
by no means possible to establish a causal link. Yet, as Speransky's
casual participation in diplomatic affairs has been so completely
neglected by his biographers, we yield to the temptation of summarizing
his views.^1 War with France, Speransky argued in 1810, is more than
probable, but it is not an immediate prospect. Napoleon has his
hands full in Spain, and his recently concluded alliance with Austria
should contribute to his feeling of security. Napoleon's Austrian
marriage, incidentally, may be a step towards a reconciliation with the
Bourbons of Spain, for the Iberian peninsula can never be subdued
unless South America were conquered too, which is certainly out of
the question. The prospect of peace for the West does not diminish
Napoleon's threat to Russia, especially in Poland. Even if France and
England come to terms, it would be to France's advantage to have
Russia embroiled in a lengthy and costly war with Turkey. Therefore,
the present conflict with the Ottoman Empire should be ended as
quickly as possible, but the steps towards peace should be taken in
secret so that Napoleon can neither prevent nor influence the settle-
ment. The most sensitive spot for Russia, and France's foremost
permanent eastern ally, is Poland. To prevent French expansion (overt
or secret) into Poland, Russia should prepare the ground for a potential
defection of Poland from France. To this end, the Russian government
should try to gain the help and friendship of the Polish nobility,
1 Speranskii: "0 vidakh frantsuzskogo pravitel'stva na Pol'shu" and "0 vidakh
Frantsii po brachnomu wiuzu 5 Avstrici," Russkaia Starina vol. 104, (1900), 429-436
- The former paper has been translated into German by Th. Schiemann and
appears in his Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I, Bd. I (Berlin 1904)
Anhang, pp. 519-526.