500 Ursula Rothe
almost certainly allowed to do so as a result of services rendered to Rome during that
conflict. The area they now inhabited formed the northernmost section of the territory
of the Eburones, who, according to the literary evidence, were exterminated by Caesar
(Caesar,de Bello Gallico6.5; 29–34; 8.24–25; Tacitus,Historiae4.12). That this was
not entirely the case is shown in the archaeological evidence for considerable continuity
in cult places, house architecture, and items of personal adornment. When the Batavi
arrived, it was as an elite warrior group privileged by Rome, and as such it is not surprising
that they took leadership in the region from this time onward (Roymans 2004: 27). It is
worth remembering the local component in the population, even though the Batavi as
an ethnic unit soon present a united picture in the archaeological and historical evidence.
It is clear that, from the beginning, the ethnogenesis of the Batavi was a direct result
of Roman activity. Augustus had a conscious policy of settling friendly groups in the
lower Rhine area (another example are the Ubii: see the following text). Although the
motives for this were strategic, the reasons for the Batavians’ special treaty may have been
in part economic. The Betuwe was a marshy, lowland landscape suited mainly to pastoral
activity; it was unlikely to produce a great deal of agricultural surplus, and indeed, the villa
culture of northern Gaul never reached into this area. Nonetheless, as Willem Willems
has pointed out, a greater role is likely to have been played by the merits of harnessing the
martial energy and internal discipline of the Germaniccomitatussystem and using them to
Rome’s advantage (Willems 1984: 367; see also Roymans 2004: 58). Nico Roymans has
argued that the original treaty between the Batavians and Rome was made by Caesar, thus
allying the Batavi to the Julio-Claudians personally. This is reflected in their privileged role
in the imperial bodyguard (Suetonius,Gaius43; Cassius Dio 55.24; Bellen 1981), in the
onomastics of the Batavian aristocracy (showing they received their Roman citizenship
from one of the early Julio-Claudian rulers), and in material finds in the Batavian area
itself, such as the large marble head of Julius Caesar, probably from the civilian settlement
at Nijmegen (Roymans 2004: 213f. and Figure 9.1).
Apart from the supply of troops and the exemption from tribute, the Batavians’ agree-
ment with Rome also included some autonomy in leadership personnel and structure.
The Chattian aristocrat who moved with his followers to the Rhine delta would appear
from the later existence of astirps regia(royal line) to have been recognized as some kind
ofrexby Rome. An inscription from Ruimel (CIL 13, 8771) from the first half of the
first centuryADnames asummus magistratusof thecivitas Batavorum, a strange appella-
tion that is almost certainly the Latinized word for a native monocratic leader (Roymans
2004: 64). The native auxiliary units were also allowed to be stationed in their homeland
and led not by Roman prefects, as was the case with the Gallic auxiliary units, but by
native commanders, ensuring the continuity of native aristocratic structures.
So what was the nature of Batavian ethnicity? Roymans (2004) has shown how the
Batavians are a perfect example of an ethnic identity being formed in the space between
a group’s actual characteristics and the image that others have of it. In this regard, the
work of Carol van Driel-Murray (2002) is especially illuminating. By studying compara-
tive examples of “ethnic soldiers” from other imperial contexts, such as the Gurkhas in
the British army, van Driel-Murray has been able to show that imperial states not only
exploited the martial prowess of native auxiliary groups, but in fact also played a large role
in the formation of their martial ideology, using it to sustain a high level of recruitment
and loyalty. The Romans indeed made a big deal of Batavian military skills. The Batavi are