The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity, 395-700 AD

JUSTINIAN AND RECONQUEST

procedure I felt absolutely necessary lest, if I changed the phraseology, I

be suspected of distorting something of the truth).

(fr. 6.1 Blockley, Menander the Guardsman, lines 175–87)

Among the clauses agreed was one relating to the movements of the Arab
groups allied to each side, who were now a more and more important factor
in the politics and settlement patterns in the east (Chapter 8), and another that
guaranteed the status of the many Christians in Persia.^37

The war in Italy

The continuous drain of resources, manpower and indeed gold on such a large
scale to the east helps to put the ‘reconquest’ of the west into a more realistic
perspective. One of the striking features about the conduct of the campaigns
is the small number of troops dispatched from Constantinople, which in turn
evoked constant complaints from the generals that they were being starved of
resources. Belisarius, for instance, found himself defending Rome with 5,000
men against a Gothic force of possibly 20,000. It is true that the Byzantine
cavalry, as mounted archers, were more mobile and thus had an advantage over
the Goths, who were armed with spears and swords; but their small numbers
constituted a major problem, especially in the early 540s after Belisarius’ recall to
Constantinople, and Totila’s accession as king of the Goths in 541. Sieges played
a major role in Ostrogothic success in these years, and the Gothic superiority in
numbers gave them the capacity to starve out the inhabitants of the towns, the
resulting loss of Byzantine control leading to Belisarius’ second Italian expedi-
tion in 544.^38 Even then he was consistently left without enough troops to give
battle effectively, as Procopius bitterly reports:

When he arrived in Italy, there was not a single day when things went

right for him, because the hand of God was unmistakably against him ...

in spite of fi ve years’ effort he never once succeeded in disembarking on

any part of the coast, unless there was a fortress handy: the whole of that

time he sailed about, trying one landing-place after another.

(Secret History 4.42; 5.1)

There were other factors that delayed a fi nal victory, including, it would seem,
the emperor’s own suspicions of his generals, especially Belisarius. Though in
fact he remained entirely loyal to Justinian, Belisarius was often recalled, and,
if we believe the disappointed Procopius, even after the inopportune death in
550 of Germanus, the newly appointed general for the Italian campaign, he
was kept in Constantinople doing nothing.^39 After his return in 549, and the
fall and occupation of Rome for the second time by Totila, it had taken the
latter’s attack on Sicily and lobbying by prominent Italians now living in Con-
stantinople to persuade Justinian to pursue the war with real force.^40 That the
eunuch Narses was able to win the fi nal battles, beginning with a naval battle