nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47killed and those Saddozais who survived the massacre were transported
to Lahore, probably along with the sword and khal‘at of Pir-i Piran. The
following year the Sikhs took Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and Dera
Ghazi Khan, while thousands of refugees flooded into Kabul in the wake of
these conquests. In Peshawar Sardar Yar Muhammad Khan accepted Sikh
suzerainty and paid tribute in return for remaining as governor. Having
pushed the northern frontier of his kingdom to the mouth of the Khyber
Pass, Ranjit Singh withdrew most of his troops across the Indus, leaving
only a small garrison at Khairabad, the modern Nowshera.
Yar Muhammad’s submission to the Sikhs was unacceptable to Sardar
Muhammad ‘Azim Khan, but he was unable to do anything about the
situation for nearly four years. In the winter of 1822, however, he finally
marched to Peshawar, where thousands of Khattak, Yusufzai and Afridi
ghazis flocked to his banner in answer to the call of jihad promulgated by
their pirs and mullahs. Sardar Yar Muhammad Khan had little choice but
to appear to go along with his half-brother’s plans, but behind his back he
was in correspondence with Ranjit Singh and eventually persuaded ‘Azim
Khan to send him to negotiate with the Maharaja. Once in the safety of the
Sikh camp Yar Muhammad Khan defected and reaffirmed his submission
to Ranjit Singh. Shah Shuja‘ too sent levies to join the Sikh army, hoping
that if Muhammad ‘Azim Khan was defeated he would regain his throne.
The Afghan and Sikh armies finally met in March 1823 outside
Nowshera, though Muhammad ‘Azim Khan appears to have been more
concerned about the safety of his treasure and womenfolk than he was
about his battle strategy. Yar Muhammad Khan’s defection and Shah Shuja‘
al-Mulk’s support for the Sikhs also increased his fear of assassination.
‘Azim Khan also distrusted the ghazis from the Khyber region for they
only obeyed orders given by their pirs. His army too was poorly trained,
armed with obsolete muskets and artillery, while the tribal levies had no
military training and many of them were children, some as young as twelve,
armed only with knives. Ranjit Singh, on the other hand, not only had the
advantage of superior numbers but European mercenaries who drilled his
troops and the artillery corps.
Initially the advantage lay with the Afghans. Muhammad Zaman Khan,
another of ‘Azim Khan’s brothers, destroyed the Attock bridge over the
Indus before the Sikhs could cross, forcing them to ford the river higher
up and under fire from jezailchis on the opposite bank. Yet despite this, the
Sikhs managed to secure a bridgehead on the right bank and the Khyber
levies retreated. ‘Azim Khan then made the fatal mistake of splitting his
army in two. The Khyber ghazis were placed on the left bank of the Kabul