nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47
former Durrani territories. Wade duly forwarded the letter to Calcutta
but included a covering letter in which he reiterated government policy
and ensured that the Amir’s request received a chilly reception. Bentinck’s
reply was blunt: while Britain sought good relations with the Amir and
his brothers, AngloAfghan relations were strictly commercial in nature
and Britain had no intention of mediating in the dispute with the Sikhs,
let alone attempting to persuade Ranjit Singh to concede any territory.
Included with the letter to the Amir was one from Wade to Masson, which
summarized the Governor General’s communication and gave him a dress
ing down for encouraging Dost Muhammad Khan to write such a letter in
the first place. Masson was reminded that the government position was that
the Amir was solely responsible for the renewal of the war and he deserved
whatever punishment the Sikhs decided to mete out. If Dost Muhammad
Khan wanted to end the war with the Sikhs, Wade continued, his best
course of action was to seek an unconditional peace with Ranjit Singh:
[The Amir] committed great precipitation in bidding defiance to
the Maharaja... If determined on hostility, he should have ascer
tained beforehand whether there was any person on whose aid or
as sistance he could depend, instead of declaring war, and finding
himself left to prosecute it with no other resources other than his
own, when it was too late to retrace his footsteps with credit. 31
Dost Muhammad further undermined his cause by hinting that if
Britain did not offer help he would seek the support of a ‘rival power’
- indeed the Amir had already written to the Shah of Persia and to St
Petersburg. Wade told Masson to make it very clear to Dost Muhammad
Khan that ‘the threat of seeking the support of a rival power... might prove
more destructive of [Barakzai] independence than any which they could
possibly take’ (Masson’s emphasis). 32
The Governor General’s reply caused considerable anger among the
Amir’s officials, who were not used to being lectured by a foreign, infidel,
power. The Amir had written in good faith and on the recommendation
of the British news writer, and Masson was ostracized for several days.
Furthermore, while the Governor General’s letter reflected the exist
ing policy, its arrival was poorly timed for the Amir and thousands of
mujahidin were poised to march on Peshawar. Fortunately for Britain the
jihad failed, but had Dost Muhammad defeated the Sikhs and marched
into the Punjab, the First AngloAfghan War might well have been fought
in 1834 on the banks of the Indus or Sutlej.