nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47and misguided’ conduct of the Sikhs, and renewed his request for British
mediation, concluding, ‘I hope your Lordship will consider me and my
country as your own.’ Less than three years later Auckland would take his
offer rather too literally. 36
Auckland’s reply was very different in tone from Bentinck’s and Masson
reported that it ‘excited a great sensation’ among senior officials. Among
other things, Dost Muhammad Khan was formally addressed by his regnal
title of Amir, rather than sardar, which the Afghan courtiers saw as tacit
recognition of Dost Muhammad Khan’s legitimacy, although it is uncertain
whether Auckland’s use of this title was deliberate or simply an oversight
by his Political Secretary, William Hay Macnaghten. The Governor General
reiterated Britain’s desire to improve commercial relations and the policy
of noninterference in the SikhAfghan dispute, but left the door ajar by
asking the Amir to inform him how he could assist in the matter. It was
in the interest of all countries in the region, Auckland wrote, for their
two nations to ‘preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and concord’.
Indeed, ‘ere long’, he planned to send a British mission to Kabul to discuss
‘commercial topics’. 37 In fact, even before the Governor General’s letter
reached Kabul, Alexander Burnes had been appointed to head this mission.
The prospect of a British envoy coming to Kabul was seen as further
evidence of a possible political rapprochement with Britain. There were
other reasons to justify this belief. In early 1836 there was a serious crisis in
AngloSikh relations after Ranjit Singh occupied outposts in Sind, which
threatened the strategic Indus port of Shikapur. Wade warned Ranjit Singh
that he risked war with Britain if he tried to extend his authority into Sind,
which Britain regarded as within its sphere of interest, and the Governor
General even began to mobilize the army. Faced with the threat from the
Sikhs, in March 1837 the Amirs of Hyderabad agreed to let their country
become a British Protectorate and Ranjit Singh, realizing he had pushed
his luck too far, backed down. As the threat of war receded, Wade set out
to repair AngloSikh relations but, as Auckland noted, Britain was now
‘irretrievably involved in the politics of the countries of the Indus’. 38
Burnes set out for Kabul in late December 1836 with the Sind crisis still
unresolved, while Dost Muhammad Khan tried to take advantage of the
British confrontation with Ranjit Singh to renew his war with the Sikhs.
Muhammad Akbar Khan was sent against the fortress of Jamrud, which
the Sikhs were constructing on the Afghan side of the Khyber Pass. He
reached Jamrud in late April 1837 and, seeing no sign of the Sikhs, began
to demolish the fortifications. While Akbar Khan’s men were occupied
with pulling down the defences, Hari Singh, who commanded the Sikh