nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47Sikhs, pointing out that there could be no improvement in transIndus
trade unless the war ended. Not only was Afghanistan on the verge of bank
ruptcy, security on the caravan routes had deteriorated to such an extent
that the Hindu banyans had stopped issuing letters of credit. Since the
Governor General had declared himself to be the friend of both Afghans
and Sikhs, the British were the obvious party to mediate in the dispute.
However, they made it clear that he was not prepared to accept any peace
deal that might be seen as capitulation. Dost Muhammad then suggested
that allowing him to exert a degree of authority over Peshawar would be
a sufficient facesa ving solution.
From the outset Burnes found himself outwitted by the Amir, who
cunningly linked negotiations for a commercial treaty with a resolution
of the conflict with the Sikhs. Burnes, however, had no freedom of action
when it came to political issues. While he made his way to Kabul, Auckland,
hearing that the Amir planned to renew his war with Ranjit Singh, had sent
Burnes a revised set of instructions, including informing Dost Muhammad
Khan not to hold ‘pretensions which he cannot maintain’, particularly in
respect of Peshawar. Burnes was also to advise the Amir that if he genu
inely wished to end the war he should formally apologize to Ranjit Singh,
preferably by sending his son Akbar Khan to Lahore. If he did so, Britain
might put in a good word about reinstating Sultan Muhammad Khan as
governor of Peshawar under Sikh authority. This decision, however, would
be entirely dependent on Ranjit Singh’s own wishes.
Dost Muhammad Khan knew that sending his son to Lahore to beg
forgiveness was not just humiliating but political suicide. While Auckland’s
position reflected government policy, it also demonstrated a profound lack
of understanding of traditional peacemaking protocols and the political
dynamics of the region. For the Amir to send his son to Lahore to sue for
peace and pardon was an admission of defeat as well as a tacit acknow
ledgement of Sikh sovereignty, which would make Dost Muhammad Khan
effectively a vassal of Ranjit Singh. This was completely unacceptable to
the Amir, the religious elites and the tribes of southern Afghanistan. As for
allowing Sultan Muhammad Khan to govern Peshawar, this too was un
acceptable. ‘Though of one family, and of one blood,’ he informed Burnes,
Sultan Muhammad Khan ‘was a more fatal enemy to him... than the
S i k h s .’ 42 Burnes informed the Governor General that the Amir had rejected
his proposal but, instead of waiting for the response from Calcutta, he tried
to negotiate a solution to the problem, convinced that he could persuade
Auckland to change his mind. In the process, Burnes raised expectations
that were both unrealistic and unrealizable.