Afghanistan. A History from 1260 to the Present - Jonathan L. Lee (2018)

nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47

Russia was encouraging the attack as a way to extend its influence into
Afghanistan and McNeill pointed out to the Shah that Kamran already
accepted limited Persian suzerainty. Shah Muhammad Qajar, though, had
demanded Kamran renounce the title of Shah and accord him the right of
khutba and coinage, as well as pay a proportion of Herat’s annual rev enues
into the Persian treasury. Shah Kamran refused, pointedly reminding Shah
Muhammad that it had been a Persian monarch who had appointed Saddu
Khan as Mir-i Afghaniha and bestowed on him the title of sultan. As a
direct descendant of Saddu Khan, Kamran therefore had every right to
refer to himself as shah and declared that ‘the Afghans will never permit
any other person to rule over them so long as a single Afghan remains
alive in Herat.’ 45
In October 1837 Shah Muhammad Mirza marched out of Sabzawar at
the head of an army of 36,000 men, intent not just on conquering Herat
but also subduing Khiva, Kandahar and Kabul. The Persian attack on Herat
placed Britain in an awkward position, for under the terms of the 1814
treaty Britain agreed not to intervene in any war between Persia and the
Afghans. So McNeill sent his Military Secretary, Col. Stoddard, to accom­
pany the Persian army in the hope he could eventually persuade the Shah
to abandon his plans. While Stoddard was in Nishapur, Vitkevich, the
Russian envoy who had recently been in Bukhara, arrived in the Persian
camp and announced he was on his way to Kandahar and Kabul bearing
letters from his government. Shah Muhammad then added to the paranoia
about Russian intentions by grossly exaggerating the extent of Russian
support, while the presence of Russians in the Persian army was seen as
another sign of Moscow’s involvement, though in fact these were actually
Polish deserters whom Russia had asked Persia to repatriate. Once the siege
of Herat was underway, a Persian envoy was sent to Kandahar to discuss
an alliance with the Kandahar sardars.
Fortunately for Britain and Herat, Shah Muhammad Qajar was a
poor general and the siege badly managed. Instead of concentrating all
his resources on reducing Herat, the Shah split his army. Asaf al­Daula,
governor of Khurasan, and several thousand of the Shah’s best troops,
along with a large number of artillery pieces, were sent into Badghis to
prevent a possible attack by a Sunni Confederacy led by Sher Muhammad
Khan, head of the Sunni Hazaras, and Mizrab Bi, wali of Maimana. Asaf
al­Daula faced fierce resistance and, though he eventually took and sacked
Qal‘a­yi Nau, the Aimaq retreated deep into the mountains. When Asaf
al­Daula pursued them, his men were trapped and ambushed in the deep,
narrow gorges. With casualties mounting, Asaf al­Daula appealed for