afghanistanthe Amir said that even a vague pledge by Britain to protect the Amir
from Persian aggression would be sufficient, or some token gesture over
Peshawar. He was even prepared to accept Sultan Muhammad Khan as
governor of Peshawar under Sikh suzerainty and agreed to all the Governor
General’s conditions to end the war. However, neither he nor his sons
were prepared to abase themselves before Ranjit Singh or abjectly sue for
his pardon. Burnes, though, dared not forward this final offer to Calcutta
for, in the Amir’s words, he had ‘no powers... to satisfy this nation’. 51 In
private, the Amir told Harlan it had been a great mistake to allow himself
to be drawn into the web of AngloRussian intrigue.
Burnes’s mission had failed and on 21 April 1838 the Amir formally
received Vitkevitch. Five days later Burnes left Kabul, ordering Masson to
accompany him, despite assurances from Afghan officials that he was still
a friend and would not face any recriminations if he remained. Though
Burnes did not know it, he and his companions were lucky to escape with
their lives. The Jabbar Khel planned to ambush and kill them as they made
their way through the passes to Jalalabad, but Dost Muhammad intervened
and refused to sanction their assassination and so the mission reached
Jamrud safely.
A few months later the Amir’s faith in European diplomatic integrity
received another blow when Vitkevich was recalled and revoked all offers
Simonich had made. When Vitkevich finally arrived back in St Petersburg,
Nesselrode snubbed him and sent an underling with the curt message that
the Count ‘knew of no Captain Vitkevich, except an adventurer of that
name who... had been lately engaged in some unauthorized intrigues at
Kabul and Kandahar’. 52 A furious Vitkevich returned to his lodgings, burnt
his papers and put a bullet through his brain.
Burnes must bear much of the blame for the failure of his mission, for
from the outset he failed to abide by his terms of reference, or at the very
least adopted a very creative interpretation of them. As far as Burnes was
concerned, the mission to Kabul was his opportunity to bring off a diplo
matic coup that would earn him both fame and promotion, and he was
naive, or arrogant, enough to believe he could persuade the bureaucrats in
Calcutta to endorse his actions and recommendations. However, Auckland,
rightly or wrongly, held to the official government line.
Burnes was not the only individual responsible for the debacle. His
mission was the outcome of Ellenborough’s aggressive Indus strategy,
as well as unjustified paranoia about Russian ambitions and the degree
of influence St Petersburg allegedly had over Persia. It was also naive of
Auckland to believe Burnes’s mission would not be viewed as political in