afghanistan
Britain now faced the uncomfortable reality that there was little chance
in the short term that Shah Shuja‘ could raise and train an army large or
sufficiently competent enough to sustain him in power. Even had this been
the case, the revenues of his kingdom were insufficient to pay for such an
army. The outcome was that Britain was obliged to subsidize the king’s
regiments and when they proved unwilling or incapable of defeating the
rising tide of revolt, British and Indian troops ended up fighting Shah
Shuja‘ al-Mulk’s wars for him. As early as May 1840 Sir John Hobhouse,
President of the Board of Control, gloomily concluded, privately, that
Britain faced the prospect of a ‘permanent and prolonged occupation’. 7
Even Macnaghten had to accept that Shah Shuja‘ al-Mulk’s claim that he
was popular had little basis in reality. The king’s power base was limited to a
coterie of Durrani courtiers, mostly Popalzais, and not even the Qizilbash,
who had been the military backbone of the Saddozais, could be trusted
since many of their senior commanders were related by marriage to the
family of Payinda Khan. Even Khan Shirin Khan, head of the Jawanshir
Qizilbash, who had wholeheartedly supported the British intervention,
wavered when it came to supporting Shah Shuja‘. He wanted the British
to annex all of southern Afghanistan, believing that only the British were
capable of ruling the country effectively.
Sale’s campaign in the Koh Daman and KohistanThe defeat at Saighan and the subsequent treaty between the Mir Wali and
Shah Shuja‘ forced Dost Muhammad Khan to abandon his attempt to raise
an army in Balkh. Determined to continue to fight, he accepted an invitation
from Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab and Mir Hajji to join forces and lead
an uprising in Kohistan and the Koh Daman. In 1839 these individuals had
accepted a large sum of money from Wade to topple Dost Muhammad Khan,
but a year after the occupation they were disillusioned and disappointed by
the lack of reward they had received. Shah Shuja‘ had even reduced their
allowances and demanded payment of several years’ arrears of revenue. He
also tried to tax their jagirs and nationalized auqaf holdings that Mir Hajji
and Hafizji controlled. To add to the discontent, the king forcibly conscripted
hundreds of Safis and Kohistanis into his army. As Lal remarked, ‘The people
of Kohistan were the warmest and stoutest friends of the Shah and of the
English... and they were now reckoned our enemies.’ 8
Hafizji, Mir Hajji and other religious leaders of the region refused
to pay tax on auqaf, claiming, rightly, that according to the shari‘a it
was unlawful for the civil ruler to demand revenues on land or property