afghanistanright to demand any such undertaking, they were invaders and infidels
and neither Afghan customary law nor the shari‘a required any Muslim
leader to give such a guarantee. The British had two choices: either throw
themselves on his mercy, or stand and fight to the last man. Maybe as Akbar
Khan spoke, he was thinking of how, not that long ago, Lord Bentinck and
Auckland had presented his father with a similar ultimatum: either go to
Lahore and submit in person to Ranjit Singh or risk being annihilated by
the Sikhs.
Akbar Khan’s outburst did not go down well with the other chiefs at
the meeting. He was told in no uncertain terms to sit down and shut up,
and not a word was uttered for the remainder of the reading of the treaty.
When Macnaghten finished the leaders calmly debated the pros and cons of
the agreement. After two hours the consensus of the jirga was to accept the
treaty with only a few minor changes. The evacuation would commence in
three days and in the meantime Lieutenant Trevor, who had accom panied
Macnaghten, was to act as both a hostage and liaison officer between the
two sides. The meeting ended amicably and as far as the Afghans were
concerned the agreement, though not signed or sealed, was binding since
it had been decided in jirga by all parties.
Macnaghten now had to justify what was effectively a surrender to
the Governor General as well as informing Shah Shuja‘ of the deal, for as
usual the king had not been consulted. In what was to be his last letter
to Auckland, and one that was never completed, Macnaghten argued he
had no choice but to accept the terms as it was essential to secure a pledge
of safe passage for the army, since it was incapable of fighting its way
to Jalalabad or through the Khyber Pass. Yet despite the dire situation,
Macnaghten optimistically informed Auckland that ‘we shall part with
the Afghans as friends’. 31 When Shah Shuja‘ was told of the agreement he
was furious and refused to abdicate or return to India, but he had little
choice other than to agree to the arrangement, even though, as far as he was
concerned, it was the ultimate betrayal by his British allies. The Tripartite
Treaty, which he had signed just three years earlier, was now not worth
the paper on which it was written. Instead his erstwhile allies planned to
sacrifice him in order to save their own skins and hand him and his country
over to his inveterate enemies.
Macnaghten’s treaty, however, was not quite as transparent as it seemed,
for he had composed it in such as way as to drive a wedge between Akbar
Khan and Nawab Zaman Khan on the one hand, and the Muhammadzai
sardars and Royalists on the other. Initially Macnaghten’s scheme appeared
to be working. The day after the meeting several leaders who had attended